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Abstract 
This paper explores the interface between central banks and cryptocurrencies. Focusing on the 
European Central Bank (ECB), it identifies the potential threats that the rise of cryptocurrencies 
would pose to the basic and ancillary tasks of the ECB, in particular, its monetary policy operations 
and the exercise of its supervisory functions over credit institutions and payment systems. The paper 
finds that cryptocurrencies can potentially have both direct – through their potential impact on the 
price stability and monetary policy, and central banks’ monopoly over issuing base money – and 
indirect effects on central banks, mainly through the institutions and systems that fall under the ECB’s 
scope of competence. 
To address the challenges posed by cryptocurrencies, the ECB may take both legal (including 
supervisory and oversight) measures and non-legal (or technical) measures. With respect to technical 
measures, the ECB - to the extent falling within the scope of its competence - may focus on 
improving the efficiency of existing payment systems and addressing the existing frictions in market 
infrastructures to indirectly affect the cryptocurrency markets. Alternatively, it can venture into 
issuing Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). Regarding legal measures, central banks could 
envisage regulating cryptocurrencies either directly or indirectly. However, as the most significant 
potential impact of cryptocurrencies on central banks is likely to be indirect through the impact of 
cryptocurrencies on the banking and payment systems, and given the limitations on the ECB’s 
mandate and its regulatory and supervisory tools, it is apposite for the ECB to consider using indirect 
strategies and tools to influence cryptocurrency markets. This indirect approach can be implemented 
through the ECB’s existing supervisory and oversight powers over the banking and payment systems. 
This paper specifies the direct and indirect measures and assesses their merits in addressing the 
concerns about cryptocurrencies. 
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Introduction 
Cryptocurrencies are financial technology (fintech) innovations, and similar to most financial 
innovations, they are driven by a desire to reduce transaction costs, facilitate risk management, 
complete incomplete markets by addressing agency costs arising from information asymmetry, and 
circumvent taxes and regulations or engage in regulatory arbitrage. Despite the much-touted 
economic, political, and ideological motivations behind the creation of cryptocurrencies,1 they have 
emerged to address market frictions. One such friction was the lack of a global, uncensorable peer-to-
peer (P2P) digital payment mechanism. One of the major challenges to the emergence of such a 
mechanism has been the double-spending problem. Prior to bitcoin, addressing this problem was 
delegated to trusted third parties in charge of centralized ledgers.2 Bitcoin solved the double-spending 
problem in a highly secure,3 decentralized, consensus-based and censorship-resistant manner, 
replacing the traditional trusted third parties with cryptographic proof, and affording users the 
optionality of pseudonymity and anonymity.4 
Despite their unique properties, cryptocurrencies, their underlying technology, and associated markets 
can pose risks to monetary and financial systems. Some of these risks include concerns about fraud,5 
market manipulation,6 financial crime,7 consumer protection,8 liability issues in distributed ledgers,9 
the development of large closed networks that can potentially create barriers to entry,10 concerns 
                                                 
1 For background information, see: Nathaniel Popper, Digital Gold: Bitcoin and the inside Story of the Misfits and 
Millionaires Trying to Reinvent Money (New York: Harper, 2015); Michael D Bordo and Andrew T Levin, "Central Bank 
Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary Policy," (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017).; Nick Bilton, 
American Kingpin: The Epic Hunt for the Criminal Mastermind Behind the Silk Road (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2017). 
2 For an overview of early attempts to solve this problem, see: Aaron van Wirdum, "The Genesis Files: If Bitcoin Had a First 
Draft, Wei Dai’s B-Money Was It," Bitcoin Magazine  (15 June 2018).; Aaron van Wirdum, "The Genesis Files: How David 
Chaum’s Ecash Spawned a Cypherpunk Dream," Bitcoin Magazine  (24 April 2018).; Aaron van Wirdum, "The Genesis 
Files: Hashcash or How Adam Back Designed Bitcoin’s Motor Block," Bitcoin Magazine  (4 June 2018). 
3 Thus far, Bitcoin has proved to be one of the most secure financial networks. Other blockchain-based cryptocurrencies may 
prove less secure. For example, more recently, there have been a few successful 51% attacks to perform double-spend 
attacks on some cryptocurrencies such as Verge, Bitcoin Gold, MonaCoin and more recently on Ethereum Classic. See: Cali 
Haan, "Verge, Bitcoin Gold and Monacoin Hacked," Crowdfund InsiderMay 25, 2018. 
4 Satoshi Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System," (2008). 
5 Massimo Bartoletti et al., "Dissecting Ponzi Schemes on Ethereum: Identification, Analysis, and Impact,"  (2017).; 
Financial Stability Oversight Council, "Financial Stability Oversight Council (Fsoc) 2016 Annual Report," (Washington, 
D.C.: Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2016), 127. For a definition of Ponzi scheme: see Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing 
an Unstable Economy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986; repr., 2008), 377. 
6 Anonymous (32E3690D50B3B477DF7841212D4BB938DC9CDB50307618328E7F8B53F37CC1E2), "Quantifying the 
Effect of Tether," (January 24, 2018).; John M Griffin and Amin Shams, "Is Bitcoin Really Un-Tethered?," SSRN Working 
Paper Series  (2018). 
7 Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, "Cryptocurrency and Virtual Currency: Corruption and Money Laundering/Terrorism 
Financing Risks?," in Handbook of Digital Currency: Bitcoin, Innovation, Financial Instruments, and Big Data, ed. David 
Lee Kuo Chuen (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2015).; Robert Stokes, "Virtual Money Laundering: The Case of Bitcoin 
and the Linden Dollar," Information & Communications Technology Law 21, no. 3 (2012). See also: Office of the New York 
State Attorney General, "Virtual Markets Integrity Initiative Report," (September 18, 2018). 
8 Dong He et al., "Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations," (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 
2016), 28-29. 
9 Dirk A Zetzsche, Ross P Buckley, and Douglas W Arner, "The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of 
Blockchain," University of Illinois Law Review (forthcoming)  (2017). 
10 Dong He et al., "Fintech and Financial Services: Initial Considerations," IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/17/05  (2017). 
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about data protection, taxation policy for cryptocurrencies,11 monetary policy,12 and financial 
stability.13 Further future challenges may include lack of common standards and interoperability, 
governance issues,14 privacy concerns,15 scalability,16 and potential risks in the issuance of central 
bank digital currency (CBDC) or digital base money (DBM).17 
Such multi-faceted challenges, coupled with cryptocurrencies’ price volatility and their hybrid nature, 
which allows them to be used as a means of payment,18 investment,19 and access,20 have led to a surge 
of interest in studying cryptocurrencies among regulators ranging from financial crime enforcement 
agencies to banking, securities and commodity markets regulators.21 However, these studies were 
mainly concerned with initial coin offerings (ICOs) enabled by the distributed ledger technologies 
(DLTs), blockchain and cryptocurrencies22 and potential risks and rewards of the blockchain 
technology. Several studies by the European Central Bank (ECB),23 the European Banking Authority 
(EBA),24 the International Monetary Fund (IMF),25 the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),26 the 
US Federal Reserve and its regional banks27 on the risks and rewards of cryptocurrencies have been 
                                                 
11 Aleksandra Bal, "How to Tax Bitcoin?," in Handbook of Digital Currency: Bitcoin, Innovation, Financial Instruments, 
and Big Data, ed. David Lee Kuo Chuen (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2015). 
12 Christine Lagarde, "Central Banking and Fintech—a Brave New World?," Bank of England conference, London  
(September 29, 2017). 
13 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, "Digital Currencies," (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, 
2015), 15-16. 
14 Aaron  van Wirdum, "A Primer on Bitcoin Governance, or Why Developers Aren’t in Charge of the Protocol," Bitcoin 
MagazineSept. 7, 2016. 
15 Primavera De Filippi, "The Interplay between Decentralization and Privacy: The Case of Blockchain Technologies,"  
(2016). 
16 Joseph Abadi and Markus Brunnermeier, "Blockchain economics," National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper 25407  (2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25407.; European Securities and Markets Authority, "The Distributed 
Ledger Technology Applied to Securities Markets," (Paris: European Securities and Markets Authority, 2017), 2. See also: 
Huw Van Steenis et al., "Global Insight: Blockchain in Banking: Disruptive Threat or Tool?," in Morgan Stanley Research 
Report (New York: Morgan Stanely, 2016). 
17 See: Yves Mersch, "Digital Base Money: An Assessment from the Ecb’s Perspective," in Speech at the Farewell 
ceremony for Pentti Hakkarainen, Deputy Governor of Suomen Pankki – Finlands Bank, Helsinki (16 January 2017).; 
Aleksander Berentsen and Fabian Schar, "The Case for Central Bank Electronic Money and the Non-Case for Central Bank 
Cryptocurrencies," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review  (2018). See also: Morgan Ricks, "Money as Infrastructure," 
Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 17-63  (2018). 
18 Primarily known as ‘cryptocurrencies’ 
19 Also known as ‘security tokens’ 
20 Also known as ‘utility tokens’ 
21 European Securities and Markets Authority, "The Distributed Ledger Technology Applied to Securities Markets." 
22 European Securities and Markets Authority, "Advice: Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets,"  (9 January 2019). 
23 European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes," (Frankfurt an Main: European Central Bank, October 2012). ; 
European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes- a Further Analysis,"  (2015).; European Central Bank, "The Potential 
Impact of Dlts on Securities Post-Trading Harmonisation and on the Wider Eu Financial Market Integration," (Frankfurt am 
MainSeptember 2017).; See also: Andrea Pinna and Wiebe Ruttenberg, "Distributed Ledger Technologies in Securities Post-
Trading: Revolution or Evolution?," ECB Occasional Paper Series No 172  (2016). 
24 European Banking Authority, "Eba Opinion on 'Virtual Currencies'," (London: European Banking Authority, 4 July 
2014).;  
25 Dong He et al., "Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations." 
26 Morten Bech and Rodney Grarratt, "Central Bank Cryptocurrencies," BIS Quarterly Review  (2017).; Committee on 
Payments and Market Infrastructures, "Digital Currencies."; Bank for International Settlements, "Cryptocurrencies: Looking 
Beyond the Hype," in Annual Economic Report (Basel2018). 
27 Gina C. Pieters, "The Potential Impact of Decentralized Virtual Currency on Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2016 Annual Report  (2017).; Alexander Kroeger and Asani Sarkar to 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, June 27, 2017, 2016, 
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/03/is-bitcoin-really-frictionless.html.; Aleksander Berentsen and Fabian 
Schär, "A Short Introduction to the World of Cryptocurrencies," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 100, no. 1 (First 
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conducted. In addition, there is a burgeoning literature on the economic, monetary and financial 
aspects of cryptocurrencies as they relate to central banking.28 However, the legal aspects of 
cryptocurrencies from a central banking perspective are largely understudied. This paper is an attempt 
to narrow this gap. 
To attain that objective, this paper seeks to study the relevance of cryptocurrencies to central banks, 
and specifically the ECB. It argues that since developments in the cryptocurrency ecosystem directly 
or indirectly involve the ECB’s basic tasks and other functions, there is ground for ECB intervention 
based on its mandate enshrined in articles 127 and 128 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and article 3 of the Protocol (no 4) on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter, ESCB/ECB Statute). The paper 
proceeds as follows. First, it sets the groundwork for analysis by classifying the effects of 
cryptocurrencies on central banking and linking them to the mandate and competences of the ECB. 
Second, it discusses the impact of cryptocurrencies on monetary policy and price stability by drawing 
parallels between different forms of fiat money and cryptocurrencies. As price stability is the primary 
objective of the ECB’s monetary policy and any impact on price stability would justify the direct 
involvement of the ECB in cryptocurrency markets, in the third section, the paper discusses the policy 
options of the ECB. Having found that the direct involvement of the ECB in cryptocurrency markets 
would not be desirable, in the subsequent three sections, the paper explores the impact on payment 
systems, banking system and financial stability respectively and argues that the best strategy for 
regulating cryptocurrency markets is through the existing regulatory, supervisory and oversight 
powers of the ECB over banking and payment systems. The seventh section further explores the legal 
aspects of issuing central bank digital currency (CBDC), as an indirect technical intervention. Finally, 
after exploring the venues for policy coordination at the international level, the paper presents a few 
concluding remarks. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Quarter 2018).; Aleksander Berentsen and Fabian Schar, "The Case for Central Bank Electronic Money and the Non-Case 
for Central Bank Cryptocurrencies."; David Mills et al., "Distributed Ledger Technology in Payments, Clearing, and 
Settlement," Finance and Economics Discussion Series Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal 
Reserve Board  (2016). 
28 JP Koning, "Fedcoin," Moneyness April 11, 2018 (October 19, 2014).; David Andolfatto, "Fedcoin: On the Desirability of 
a Government Cryptocurrency," MacroMania 2018 (February 03, 2015).; Sahil Gupta, Patrick Lauppe, and Shreyas 
Ravishankar, "Fedcoin: A Blockchain-Backed Central Bank Cryptocurrency,"  (2017).; Morten Bech and Rodney Grarratt, 
"Central Bank Cryptocurrencies."; Michael Kumhof and Clare Noone, "Central Bank Digital Currencies — Design 
Principles and Balance Sheet Implications," Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 725  (2018).; John Barrdear and 
Michael Kumhof, "The Macroeconomics of Central Bank Issued Digital Currencies," Bank of England Staff Working Paper 
No. 605  (2016).; Michael D Bordo and Andrew T Levin, "Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary 
Policy."; Aleksander Berentsen and Fabian Schar, "The Case for Central Bank Electronic Money and the Non-Case for 
Central Bank Cryptocurrencies."; Eswar Prasad, "Central Banking in a Digital Age: Stock-Taking and Preliminary 
Thoughts," Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at Brookings  (April 2018).; Larry White, "The World's First 
Central Bank Electronic Money Has Come – and Gone: Ecuador, 2014-2018," Alt-M: Ideas for an Alternative Monetary 
Future  (March 29, 2018).; Jack Meaning et al., "Broadening Narrow Money: Monetary Policy with a Central Bank Digital 
Currency," Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 724  (2018). 
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1. Cryptocurrencies and the ECB: direct and indirect links  
Despite a decade-long struggle to gain traction, the jury is still out on the success or failure of 
cryptocurrency experiments. If the popularity of cryptocurrencies passes a certain tipping point, they 
could pose threats to the financial system with a direct impact on central banks both in their monetary 
policy capacity, and supervisory and oversight capacity. Some of these challenges would pose threats 
to the activities, financial market infrastructures (FMIs) and entities that fall within the scope of 
ECB’s basic tasks and other functions. 
According to article 127(1) of the TFEU and article 2 of the ESCB/ECB Statute, maintaining price 
stability is the primary objective of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).29 The functions of 
the ESCB include basic tasks30 and other functions (non-basic or ancillary tasks). The ESCB’s basic 
tasks include defining and implementing monetary policy of the Union, conducting foreign-exchange 
operations, holding and managing the official foreign reserves of the Member States, and promoting 
the smooth operation of payment systems.31 The non-basic or ancillary tasks of the ESCB include 
issuance of banknotes,32 contribution to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and stability 
of the financial system,33 advisory functions,34 collection of statistical information35 and international 
cooperation and external operations.36 Within this framework and within the confines of this study, 
cryptocurrencies can directly or indirectly fall within the tasks and competence of the ESCB if they 
pose threats to one of its basic and ancillary tasks.  
It seems that the potential effects of cryptocurrencies on central banks can be divided into two broad 
categories of direct and indirect effects. The direct effects include those that have an impact on the 
monetary policy, price stability and central banks’ monopoly over issuing base money (e.g., 
banknotes) or the ECB’s ability to control the money supply, which can be viewed as a sine qua non 
for the success of the price stability mandate and the conduct of monetary policy. In contrast, the 
indirect effects are those that largely stem from the interface between the banking and payment 
systems with cryptocurrencies, both of which fall within the scope of competence of the ECB. 
Needless to say, the interface between the banking and payment systems is where the potential 
systemic risk and financial stability concerns lie. 
                                                 
29 This is why some commentators call the ECB a single mandate central bank. There have been calls to change the mandate 
of the ECB. See for instance: Joseph E Stiglitz, The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016). 
30 See: Article 127(2) TFEU and art. 3.1 ESCB Statute. 
31 Art. 127(2) TFEU and article 3 ESCB/ECB Statute. For this classification, see also: Rosa María Lastra, "The Law of the 
European Central Bank," in International Financial and Monetary Law, ed. Rosa María Lastra (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 255. 
32 According to article 128(1) of the TFEU and article 16 of the ESCB/ECB Statute, the ECB has the “exclusive right to 
authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union”. 
33 Art. 127(5) of the TFEU 
34 Advisory functions are set out in article 127(4) of the TFEU, which states that the ECB should be consulted “on any 
proposed Union act in its fields of competence” and national authorities should consult the ECB with respect to “any draft 
legislative provision in its fields of competence”.  
35 Article 5, ESCB/ECB Statute 
36 See: Rosa María Lastra, "The Law of the European Central Bank," 266. 
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However, addressing these direct and indirect effects should remain within the limitations imposed on 
the ECB’s functions. In addition to the constraints imposed on its fields of competence, the EU 
primary and secondary legislation set limitations on the tools that the ECB can use to achieve its 
objectives. To carry out the tasks of the ESCB, the ECB is granted the powers to adopt legal acts with 
direct effects on third parties other than the National Central Banks (NCBs) and the Eurosystem by 
making regulations necessary to implement such tasks and taking decisions.37 It can also impose fines 
(through its decisions) and periodic penalty payments on the undertakings that fail to comply with its 
regulations and decisions.38  
In addition to its regulatory powers, the ECB has advisory powers, with which it can adopt non-
binding recommendations and opinions within its field of competence.39 These recommendations can 
be used to initiate EU legislation or to provide the impetus for action to be taken.40 With respect to 
initiating legislation, the ECB has shared competence with the European Commission to initiate the 
adoption of secondary legislation, to complement or amend the ESCB/ECB Statute (i.e., 
complementary legislation).41 Furthermore, the ECB should be consulted “on any proposed Union act 
in its fields of competence” and national authorities should consult the ECB with respect to “any draft 
legislative provision in its fields of competence”.42 With the creation of the banking union and the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the ECB has been granted further rule-making powers in the 
area of financial services regulation.43 These powers include adopting regulations, guidelines and 
recommendations, and taking decisions “without prejudice to the competence and the tasks of EBA, 
ESMA, EIOPA, and the ESRB.”44 
Given these regulatory, supervisory and oversight tools at its disposal, it appears that the ECB may 
influence the cryptocurrency ecosystem either directly or indirectly. Direct regulation refers to 
regulatory measures focusing immediately on the regulation of the industry itself as a discrete 
activity45 or on the activities immediately performed by business entities, targeting the industry’s 
                                                 
37 For example, the approval of the volume of coin issuance and sanctions are in the form of decisions.  
38 Art. 132(3) of the TFEU. See also: Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of 
the European Central Bank to impose sanctions (OJ L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 4).; 
Council Regulation (EU) 2015/159 of 27 January 2015 amending Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 concerning the powers of the 
European Central Bank to impose sanctions, OJ L 27, 3.2.2015, p. 1–6; 
Article 18(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. 
39 Art. 132(1) of the TFEU 
40 Sheller K. Hanspeter, The European Central Bank: History, Role and Functions, Second ed. (Frankfurt am Main: 
European Central Bank, 2006). The ECB recommendation can be viewed as an instrument by which the ECB encourages 
action by EU institutions or Member States. See: ibid., 71-72. 
41 Article 129 TFEU and Article 41 ESCB/ECB Statute See: ibid., 70-71. 
42 Art. 127(4) of the TFEU 
43 See: Articles 4(3) and 6(5)(a) of the Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (SSM Regulation) 
44 See Art. 3(3) of the SSM Regulation, and Asen Lefterov, "The Single Rulebook: Legal Issues and Relevance in the Ssm 
Context," ECB Legal Working Paper Series No 15/ October 2015  (2015): 17. The acronyms respectively stand for: the 
European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board.  
45 Phoebus Athanassiou, Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union: Current Trends and Future Prospects (Alphen aan 
den Rijn (The Netherlands): Kluwer Law International, 2009), 227. For the application of the concept of direct and indirect 
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structure, strategies, and operations, whereas indirect regulation constitutes “market discipline-
inspired regulatory measures targeting the creditors and counterparties” of those entities.46 Direct 
regulation mainly relies on the threat of the law by using command-and-control regulatory 
instruments,47 whereas indirect regulation mainly relies on economic instruments.48 As its tools, direct 
regulation often employs registration, disclosure, capital requirements, and position limits as 
regulatory instruments. In contrast, indirect regulation utilizes an intermediary to transmit the 
imperatives or commands to the (primarily intended) regulated entity or activity that is the ultimate 
target.49 Indirect regulation is often viewed as a more efficient strategy in financial regulation in the 
presence of suitable ‘surrogate regulators’.50  
Despite the potential direct impact of the cryptocurrencies on central banking, given the limited scope 
for direct intervention by the ECB, the paper will mainly be focused on the indirect intervention 
through the ECB’s supervisory powers over the banking entities51 as well as its regulatory and 
oversight powers over payment systems.52 However, even within the indirect approach, given the 
hybrid nature of cryptocurrencies and the constraints on the ECB’s scope of competence and 
regulatory powers, the ECB, as a regulator, supervisor or overseer, may not act alone in addressing 
the challenges of cryptocurrencies. In certain areas, the ECB can act as a catalyst for change, (e.g., 
within its advisory capacity) or act in tandem with other regulators (such as the European 
Commission and the European Parliament, the EBA, and the National Competent Authorities (NCAs) 
including NCBs), or act in accordance with its contributory competence in protecting financial 
stability in cooperation with the NCAs. Furthermore, at the international level, the ECB can 
contribute to the policy formulation within the international financial fora, in particular within the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB). 
                                                                                                                                                        
regulation in the regulation of the hedge fund industry, see: Hossein Nabilou and Alessio M. Pacces, "The Hedge Fund 
Regulation Dilemma: Direct Vs. Indirect Regulation," William & Mary Business Law Review 6, no. I (2015). 
46 Phoebus Athanassiou, Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union: Current Trends and Future Prospects, 227.  
47 Command-and-control instruments are the most traditional methods of effecting a behavioral change in the subjects of 
regulation. See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 17-
38. 
48 Phoebus Athanassiou, Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union: Current Trends and Future Prospects. 
The roots of the distinction between command-and-control and economic instruments can originally be found in the 
literature on legal origins. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, vol. 5 (New York: Aspen Law and 
Business, 1998), 21-35.; La Porta et al. show that countries with civil and common law traditions demonstrate different 
regulatory styles. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, "The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origins," Journal of Economic Literature 46, no. 2 (2008): 285-86, 93, 305, 26. 
49 Phoebus Athanassiou, Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union: Current Trends and Future Prospects, 227-28 & 
34. 
50 Hossein Nabilou and Alessio M. Pacces, "The Hedge Fund Regulation Dilemma: Direct Vs. Indirect Regulation." 
51 For example, as the ECB is bound to collateralize its credit operations under article 18.1, second indent of the ESCB/ECB 
Statute, the ECB can refuse any cryptocurrency collateral or any asset that is linked to cryptocurrencies as collateral under its 
collateral regime. 
52 For example, such a regulatory approach would be conducted through setting out participation and access criteria for 
payment and banking institutions involved in cryptocurrency business for the access to the TARGET2. 
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2. Cryptocurrencies, monetary policy, and price stability  
At least two catalysts can act as an impetus for the ECB’s direct involvement in the cryptocurrency 
markets due to their direct impact on the instruments exclusively issued by the ECB (i.e., banknotes). 
The first catalyst would be the functional similarities between cryptocurrencies and the base money 
issued by central banks, and the second would be the potential for wider adoption of cryptocurrencies 
that would have a negative impact on the basic tasks of the ECB, i.e., by having an impact on the 
transmission of monetary policy, ultimately affecting price stability. 
Lex Monetae is the body of laws and regulations that defines the monetary law of a state or a currency 
union. In the euro area, in addition to the TFEU and the ESCB/ECB Statute, the Lex Monetae of the 
Eurozone participating Member States is embedded in the Council Regulation 974/9853 and the 
Council Regulation (EC) 1103/97.54 The former regulation “defines monetary law provisions of the 
Member States which have adopted the euro’.55 Article 2 of this regulation sets the euro as the 
currency of the participating Member States. Within this framework, the ECB has “the exclusive right 
to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union”.56 Although the Member States can issue 
euro coins, the volume of such issue is subject to the approval by the ECB.57 The banknotes and coins 
issued by the ECB and National Central Banks (NCBs) have the legal tender status within the 
Union.58 
Granting full control over the base money enables the Eurosystem to formulate and implement 
monetary policy.59 This is perhaps why when the Managing Director at Estonian e-Residency laid out 
its proposal for issuing crypto tokens - called ‘estcoins’ - to its e-residents through an ICO,60 ECB’s 
Mario Draghi adamantly opposed it stating that “… no member state can introduce its own 
currency… The currency of the euro zone is the euro.”61 Developments of this kind, along with the 
keen interest of central banks in studying and, as regards some, exploring the possibility of issuing 
                                                 
53 Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro, OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1–5 
54 Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro, OJ L 
162, 19.6.1997, p. 1–3 
55 Council Regulation 974/98, recital 1. 
56 Art. 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB/ECB Statute 
57 Art. 128(2) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB/ECB Statute 
58 Art. 128(1) of the TFEU and Article 16 ESCB/ECB Statute. See also Art. 11 of the Regulation 974/98. As the delegation 
of monetary sovereignty is ‘complete, unconditional, and irrevocable’, the only source of monetary law in the eurozone 
participating Member States is the EU law. See: Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 7 ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012).; Helmut Siekmann, "Exit, Exclusion, and Parallel Currencies in the Euro Area," Institute for 
Monetary and Financial Stability Working Paper Series No. 99 (2015)  (2015): 13. 
59 Sheller K. Hanspeter, The European Central Bank: History, Role and Functions, 48. 
60 Kaspar Korjus to E-Residency Blog, August 22, 2017, 2017, https://medium.com/e-residency-blog/estonia-could-offer-
estcoins-to-e-residents-a3a5a5d3c894.; Lionel  Laurent, "The Bitcoin Sovereign Wealth Fund; Estonia Wants in on the 
Crypto-Currency Bubble," Bloomberg August 25, 2017. 
61 Reuters Staff, "Ecb’s Draghi Rejects Estonia’s Virtual Currency Idea," Reuters September 7, 2017. Although such a 
position by the president of the ECB could be criticized on the ground that non-euro denominated cryptocurrencies, which 
are not intended to serve as legal tender, despite being issued by state actors would not be in contravention to the EU 
primary or secondary laws. For details about the legal issues of Non-euro denominated CBDC, see: Phoebus L. Athanassiou, 
Digital Innovation in Financial Services: Legal Challenges and Regulatory Policy Issues (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International B.V., 2018), 204-06.  
 9 
their own digital currencies,62 have shown the importance of the preservation of the unit of account as 
a coordination device across many products and services for the society at large.  
In this sense, issuing any cryptocurrencies or parallel units of account – in particular by a state actor - 
offering functionalities similar to central bank money (CeBM) or base money could be in 
contradiction to article 128(1) of the TFEU, article 16 of the ESCB/ECB Statute, as well as article 11 
of the regulation 974/98, and would be deemed illegal. In what follows, highlighting the functional 
similarities between cryptocurrencies and CeBM we argue that such similarities would eventually 
trigger the involvement of central banks in cryptocurrencies. Although issuing banknotes and coins is 
not specified as a basic task, given the ECB’s exclusive right to issue base money,63 and the close 
relationship between this right and price stability, we start with exploring the relationship and 
similarities between cryptocurrencies and CeBM, and the potential impact of cryptocurrencies on the 
monopoly of central banks over issuing base money, and then turn to the impact of cryptocurrencies 
on monetary policy and price stability. 
2.1. Cryptocurrencies’ similarities to base money 
Despite the fact that issuing base money (note issue) has been considered as the raison d’être of 
central banking,64 it is not included in the basic tasks of the ECB. In addition, the ECB’s “exclusive 
right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes within the Union”65 does not mean that issuing money is 
the sole prerogative of central banks. Indeed, commercial banks have been in the business of money 
creation long before the advent of modern central banking.66 Despite the legal tender designation of 
                                                 
62 Morten Bech and Rodney Grarratt, "Central Bank Cryptocurrencies.". Other central banks, such as Sweden’s Riksbank, 
are considering issuing digital currencies (e-krona in the case of Riksbank), though at the time of writing, there is no final 
decision as to the issue or technical specification of e-krona. To follow this project, See: Sveriges Riksbank, "The 
Riksbank’s E‐Krona Project, Report 1," in E-krona reports (Stockholm: Sveriges Riksbank, September 2017).; Sveriges 
Riksbank, "The Riksbank’s E‐Krona Project Report 2," in E-krona reports (Stockholm: Sveriges Riksbank, October 2018). 
For the pros and cons of central bank digital currencies, see; Max Raskin and David Yermack, "Digital Currencies, 
Decentralized Ledgers, and the Future of Central Banking," (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016).;  
63 Art. 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB/ECB Statute. 
64 Rosa María Lastra, "Central Banking Law," 31, 34. See also: Charles Goodhart, The Evolution of Central Banks 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991). 
65 Art. 128(1) TFEU and Article 16 ESCB/ECB Statute. 
66 Unlike many suggestions to the contrary, issuing money has not been the sole prerogative of governments. History has 
witnessed instances of successful and sustainable private money competing with the sovereign money and even threatening 
its dominance. See: George A Selgin, Good Money: Birmingham Button Makers, the Royal Mint, and the Beginnings of 
Modern Coinage, 1775-1821 (University of Michigan Press, 2011), 12-13. (See especially chapter VI, explaining how 
private coinage become outlawed, in particular recounting Mr. Monck’s gold coins). 
See also: Charles A. E. Goodhart, "The Two Concepts of Money: Implications for the Analysis of Optimal Currency Areas," 
European Journal of Political Economy 14, no. 3 (1998): 418. 
It seems that China was the first country that introduced fiat money and the concept of legal tender. See Eswar S Prasad, 
Gaining Currency: The Rise of the Renminbi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). Chapter 1. Prior to fiat money, the 
history of paper money goes back to more than 2,000 years ago in China, where the bills of exchange (used as money) were 
known as ‘flying money’. See: Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of 
Financial Crises, 5 ed. (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005), 75-76. See also: David Wolman, The End of 
Money: Counterfeiters, Preachers, Techies, Dreamers--and the Coming Cashless Society (Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 
2012). There have also been periods during which private bank notes coexisted alongside the government-issued banknotes. 
See for example: Warren E. Weber, "Government and Private E-Money-Like Systems: Federal Reserve Notes and National 
Bank Notes," Bank of Canada Working Paper 2015-18  (2015). See also: Lawrence H. White, "Competing Money 
Supplies," The Library of Economics and Liberty  (2018). 
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CeBM, which consists of banknotes and coins,67 evidence from the UK suggests that banks create and 
allocate approximately 97% of the money supply.68 However, there are significant differences 
between commercial bank money (CoBM) and cryptocurrencies that would warrant a different 
approach by central banks towards cryptocurrencies. 
 
 
 
Unlike bitcoin, both CoBM (or bank-issued IOUs representing a claim against a commercial bank in 
CeBM) and shadow banking quasi-money (securities or promises to pay CeBM or CoBM during a 
certain period of time in the future)69 are claims against the issuer. This difference in nature entails 
that cryptocurrencies are also different in terms of the risks associated with them. Even if central 
banks pursue a price stability objective, CeBM is prone to an inflation risk.70 However, bitcoin 
effectively carries no inflation risk as it has a capped and fixed supply schedule.71 Similar to CeBM, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Only in contemporary history has the state had the monopoly over issuing banknotes (legal tender). For example, the first 
Legal Tender Act in the U.S. was passed in February 1862 authorizing the issuance of notes (greenbacks) which were 
“lawful money and legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private within the United States”. This act was part of the 
government efforts to finance the civil war. It seems that until 1862, the issuance of banknotes was mainly a private 
enterprise in the US, a historical episode sometimes dubbed ‘free banking era’.  
Alternatives to standard monopoly on the issuance of notes by the central bank is minimal competition (central bank issued 
notes with commercial bank issued notes backed by the central bank notes on a one to one basis, e.g., of Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, where bank-issued notes are allowed, but backed by the Bank of England notes, currency boards and real 
competition (free banking). See Rosa María Lastra, "Central Banking Law," 33-34. 
67 Thomas J. Jordan, "How Money Is Created by the Central Bank and the Banking System," (Zurich: Swiss National Bank, 
16 January 2018). It should be noted that Demand deposits held by commercial banks at the central bank are also part of the 
CeBM. However, only banknotes and coins are legal tender, but not the demand deposits held by commercial banks at the 
central bank.  
68 Michael; McLeay, Amar Radia, and Ryland Thomas, "Money in the Modern Economy: An Introduction," Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1  (2014 Q1).; Michael;  McLeay, Amar; Radia, and Ryland  Thomas, "Money Creation 
in the Modern Economy," ibid.;  
69 Perry Mehrling, "The Inherent Hierarchy of Money," Social Fairness and Economics: economic essays in the spirit of 
Duncan Foley 169 (2012). 
70 Thomas J. Jordan, "How Money Is Created by the Central Bank and the Banking System." 
71 This cap can also be changed in the protocol if there is sufficient consensus. It seems that such a consensus would be very 
hard to come by. 
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bitcoin carries no default risk as on-chain bitcoin transactions are conducted on a near real-time gross 
settlement basis on the Bitcoin blockchain.72 However, the elimination of inflation risk comes at the 
cost of price volatility, given that bitcoin’s fixed supply schedule is unable to effectively respond to 
demand shocks for bitcoin. Therefore, unlike CeBM or CoBM, bitcoin exposes users to the risks 
associated with price volatility.  
CoBM is decentralized in its creation in the sense that it is demand-driven (i.e., demand for credit) 
and is created by commercial banks as they make loans (i.e., endogenous money).73 In other words, 
the distinctive feature of CoBM is that it is a relatively decentralized credit creation and allocation 
mechanism, which is elastic and responsive to the demand shocks.74 However, in addition to inflation 
risks, CoBM carries default risks. Although money creation in the commercial banking sector remains 
discretionary, the ability of a commercial bank in creating money is limited by the central bank’s 
monetary policy, and risk-return calculations of commercial banks (including considerations of 
current and future interest rates, the likelihood of defaults on loans or deposit withdrawals) and capital 
and liquidity requirements.75 
 
 Inflation risk Counterparty risk Volatility risk 
CeBM ✓ ✕ ✕ 
CoBM ✓ ✓ ✕ 
Bitcoin ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Comparison of bitcoin with CeBM & CoBM in terms of risk profile 
 
CoBM is issued by commercial banks, which in major jurisdictions are licensed or supervised by 
central banks, and – where available - enjoy the protection of deposit insurance fund. In addition, on a 
                                                 
72 Although there is no counterparty default risk in bitcoin transactions, using bitcoin exposes the users to operational or 
technical risks stemming from the settlement finality risks. As will be explained in section 4 of this paper, transactions in 
bitcoin often are batched by the miners and appended to the latest blockchain which on average takes ten minutes. During 
this time and the time that is required for the transaction to be deemed final (customarily six confirmations taking 
approximately sixty minutes), the users are exposed to the technical or operational risks. Therefore, bitcoin transactions are 
not real-time. Though they cannot be viewed as the equivalent of Deferred Net Settlement (DNS) Systems as they do not 
offer the advantages of that system in terms of economizing on liquidity and do not have counterparty default risks between 
the execution and settlement endemic to the DNS systems. For the lack of a better term, we use near real-time settlement. 
73 See: Claudio Borio, "The Financial Cycle and Macroeconomics: What Have We Learnt?," Journal of Banking & Finance 
45 (2014).; Richard A. Werner, "How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms Not Do the Same? An 
Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking," International Review of Financial Analysis 36 (2014).; 
Richard A. Werner, "Can Banks Individually Create Money out of Nothing? — the Theories and the Empirical Evidence," 
International Review of Financial Analysis 36 (2014).; Richard A. Werner, "A Lost Century in Economics: Three Theories 
of Banking and the Conclusive Evidence," International Review of Financial Analysis 46 (2016).; Giancarlo Bertocco, 
"Endogenous Money," in The Encyclopedia of Central Banking, ed. Louis-Philippe Rochon and Sergio Rossi (Northampton, 
MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015).; 
74 This would mean that it is unlikely that cryptocurrencies would eliminate the need for CoBM. 
75 Thomas J. Jordan, "How Money Is Created by the Central Bank and the Banking System." 
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daily basis, CeBM is used as the ultimate settlement asset in wholesale payment systems, which 
means that the value and convertibility of CoBM is being put to the test on a daily basis.76 In other 
words, despite its designation as privately issued money, in effect, CoBM is an extension of CeBM. 
However, this daily final settlement in CeBM, which ensures the convertibility of CoBM to CeBM, 
does not in principle apply to cryptocurrencies as most of them do not aim to maintain a par value 
with fiat currencies. In other words, the value of CoBM is pegged to CeBM and it is a claim against 
the commercial bank to pay CeBM. It is exactly in this sense that cryptocurrencies are essentially 
different from CoBM, despite both being private money. 
Since cryptocurrencies are used as the ultimate settlement asset within their own blockchains, they 
bear a resemblance to CeBM as the ultimate settlement asset both for retail and wholesale payments. 
As the ECB has monopoly on the issuance of the ultimate settlement asset,77 potential wider adoption 
of cryptocurrencies by the general public and their use as the settlement asset within their own 
blockchains covering everyday transactions would be in direct contradiction with that role of CeBM. 
In other words, the daily convertibility of CoBM to CeBM entails that CoBM does not attempt to 
become a unit of account and a separate parallel currency, and directly compete with CeBM, but 
cryptocurrencies do. 
To conclude, bitcoin and many other cryptocurrencies are not credit or shadow banking quasi-money; 
they share with CeBM the key feature that they do not represent a claim.78 At least in theory, mass 
adoption of cryptocurrencies could challenge the monetary sovereignty of a nation-state (i.e., the 
monetary policy flexibility and independence and central banks’ control over money supply) and 
governments’ seigniorage revenues coming from creating money. Needless to say, the realization of 
such potential threats, however unlikely they may be, would justify the central banks’ intervention. 
2.2. Impact on price stability 
Unit of account is the signature property of money.79 Stability of the unit of account is crucial for a 
currency to become and remain a unit for the uniform measurement of value across several goods and 
                                                 
76 European Central Bank, The Payment System: Payments, Securities and Derivatives, and the Role of the Eurosystem 
(Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank, 2010), 45. 
77 Although CoBM can also be used as ultimate settlement asset (especially in some cross-border payments and settlements 
systems), most international standards as well as national regulations require the use of CeBM in the wholesale payments 
and settlement systems. See: Regulation of the European Central Bank (EU) No 795/2014 of 3 July 2014 on oversight 
requirements for systemically important payment systems (ECB/2014/28) OJ L 217, 23.7.2014, p. 16–30, Art. 10 
78 Max Raskin and David Yermack, "Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers, and the Future of Central Banking.". 
Similar to CeBM, bitcoin is not a claim or promise to pay and despite its accounting treatment, central banks do not view 
CeBM as a liability. See: European Central Bank, "What Is Money?," European Central Bank, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/what_is_money.en.html. 
However, it seems that even in its current form CeBM could be thought of as a ‘liability’ or promise. See: Nick Rowe, 
"From Gold Standard to Cpi Standard," in Worthwhile Canadian Initiative: A mainly Canadian economics blog (2012).; 
Nick Rowe, "Is Money a Liability?," in Worthwhile Candadian Initiative: A mainly Canadian economics blog (2012). 
79 Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money. 
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services. Therefore, it is no surprise that ensuring price stability through inflation targeting has 
become one of the primary objectives of central banking.80 
Central banks often view competition in the provision of currencies somewhat healthy for the 
economy, in that multiple issuers of money can help enhance innovation and efficiency in the 
provision of payment and other financial services.81 For example, in ECB’s view, neither mono-
banking (central bank as the only issuer of money) nor free banking (commercial banks as the sole 
money suppliers) are sufficiently stable or efficient, and coexistence of CeBM and CoBM should be 
preserved.82 However, as mentioned earlier, there is a fundamental difference between privately 
issued bank liabilities like money, and cryptocurrencies. If, similar to cryptocurrencies, bank 
liabilities had different values independently of the CeBM and accordingly the prices would have 
been quoted in terms of those liabilities, every good or service would have had different quoted 
prices,83 making it virtually impossible for the central bank to pursue its price stability objective. If a 
central bank cannot guarantee the uniform value of the unit of account, it would mean that multiple 
currencies would be used in a single currency area. This, in turn, would create obstacles to trade in a 
single market.84 This scenario would be highly likely if various cryptocurrencies – especially issued 
by various state actors - were widely accepted.85  
In addition to being detrimental to the integrity of the unit of account, cryptocurrencies can have an 
impact on price stability by their potential impact on the demand for CeBM and on the control of 
money through the open market operations of central banks.86 As for the former, based on the quantity 
theory of money (QTM),87 the impact of cryptocurrencies on price stability highly depends on their 
impact on the quantity and the velocity of money. Firstly, if widely accepted, cryptocurrencies can 
affect price stability by increasing the quantity of money in circulation. Secondly, wider acceptance of 
cryptocurrencies would decrease the velocity of fiat money, because the increased use of 
cryptocurrencies would eat into the share of the fiat money in real-world and virtual transactions.88 In 
addition, general acceptance of cryptocurrencies can cause distortions to the information content of 
monetary aggregates.89 At its extreme, if public acceptance of cryptocurrencies would reach levels 
                                                 
80 Although central banks either have a single mandate such as the ECB which is price stability, or they have dual mandate 
such as the US Federal Reserve which is price stability and employment, price stability has always been one of their basic 
tasks. Recently, there are suggestions to move from inflation targeting to (N)GDP targeting. 
81 European Central Bank, The Payment System: Payments, Securities and Derivatives, and the Role of the Eurosystem, 45. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 It is noteworthy to mention that the wider adoption and circulation of cryptocurrencies as a means of payment may not be 
in contradiction to legal tender laws (e.g., Art. 10, 11 of the Regulation 974/98), despite its potential damage to the integrity 
of the unit of account. 
86 European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes."; European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes- a Further 
Analysis.". 
87 According to the quantity theory of money (QTM), the following equation relates the aggregate prices (P) and total money 
supply (M): P = MV/Y, where V is velocity of money and Y is real output. 
88 Since the number of transactions would not be measurable in a centralized way, the velocity of money would also be 
unknown for the central bankers. 
89 ECB VC schemes, 2012. This concern has also been raised in the context of e-money. 
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that the CeBM would no longer define the unit of account, similar to the historical cases of 
dollarization, central bank monetary policy could become obsolete.90  
Thus far, there is no empirical evidence on the impact of cryptocurrencies on price stability. However, 
the price stability objective of central banks would be under threat by the proliferation and wider 
acceptance of cryptocurrencies through their impact on the demand for money and on the mechanism 
for the transmission of monetary policy. This would keep central banks on their toes, as it would pose 
both reputational risks to central banks and would jeopardize the mechanism at their disposal for 
carrying out their basic tasks. 
2.3. Impact on monetary policy 
In addition to the impact on the demand for CeBM, cryptocurrencies can affect monetary policy 
indirectly by removing certain policy options necessary for its implementation. In this respect, the 
potential impact of cryptocurrencies can be explained in light of the trilemma of international 
finance.91 Such an effect can be materialized by providing new venues for the users of the currency to 
circumvent capital controls.92 The trilemma of international finance suggests that for every country, it 
is only possible to have two of the following policy options at any point in time: unrestricted 
international capital markets, a managed exchange rate, and an independent monetary policy.93 Wider 
or even global adoption of cryptocurrencies would render international capital markets unrestricted by 
default.94 Therefore, there remain two options for policymakers and central banks from which only 
one should be chosen: managed exchange rates or independent monetary policy. In this scenario, if a 
country wants to manage its exchange rate, its monetary policy will automatically become reactive 
and cease to be independent.95 
As mentioned throughout the paper, the impact of cryptocurrencies on central banks are largely 
dependent on the widespread adoption of such currencies by the general public. However, despite 
bitcoin’s unique attributes and the fact that the wider adoption of parallel cryptocurrencies would 
make it difficult for central banks to achieve their price stability objective, the prospect of the CeBM 
being replaced by bitcoin is virtually nil.96 This is mainly due to certain limitations that are embedded 
                                                 
90 Dong He, "Monetary Policy in the Digital Age," Finance & Development 55, no. 2 (June 2018). 
91 Frederic S. Mishkin, The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, 11 ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2016), 508-09. 
92 Gina C. Pieters, "The Potential Impact of Decentralized Virtual Currency on Monetary Policy." 
93 Ibid., 23-24. 
94 Ibid., 20-25. 
95 Otherwise, if a country chooses unrestricted international capital markets, and independent monetary policy, it should 
invariably adopt a floating exchange rate because it will be bereft of tools to manage its exchange rate.  
96 A virtually hard cap and inflexible supply schedule on the number of bitcoins begets price volatility in response to the 
demand shocks, making it a hard sell as a unit of account. The hard cap on the number of bitcoins additionally means that 
the adoption of bitcoin by any country would put hard limits on the monetary policy and effectively remove monetary 
sovereignty, making bitcoin unattractive for any country to use it as a currency. Therefore, in its current form, price stability 
under bitcoin standard would be highly unlikely. In terms of monetary policy, bitcoin is dissimilar to CoBM, which is 
demand driven and very much responsive to the demands for credit. The same applies to the quasi-money created by the 
shadow banking system. 
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in the Bitcoin protocol by design. Due to the limitation on supply, unlike CeBM, bitcoin does not 
have inflation risk.97 However, it has compromised three important functions of a stable monetary 
system. First, within a monetary system based on bitcoin, first, there would be no protection against 
the risk of structural deflation. Second, the inflexible supply schedule would deprive policymakers of 
significant policy levers and remove the possibility of any flexible response to temporary shocks to 
bitcoin demands and the possibility of smoothing the business cycle and minimizing macroeconomic 
dislocations, which is considered one of the main functions of monetary policy.98 And third, such 
limitations would effectively remove the possibility of having a lender of last resort (LOLR).99 As a 
consequence, in its current form, price stability under the bitcoin standard would be hard to achieve. 
This discourages bitcoin adoption at the nation-state or the currency-area level.100 The above-
mentioned limitations put specific constraints on bitcoin’s promise of becoming a unit of account that 
aims to replace CeBM.101  
This being said, it is not impossible to conceive a scenario where a widely accepted cryptocurrency 
would become a parallel or concurrent currency exerting competitive pressure on CeBM.102 In that 
case, the question would be whether it is acceptable for central banks - as part of their mandate to 
oversee the payment system and the wider FMIs - to welcome the existence of parallel currencies (and 
payment systems) outside the current formal banking and payment systems and with a settlement 
asset on which the central bank has no control. Although the coexistence of centralized and 
decentralized payment systems would ensure an additional layer of redundancy and would increase 
the resilience of the overall payment system,103 it may forgo the benefits of economies of scale in 
using a single payment system and it would pose threats to the credibility of the unit of account if 
those alternative cryptocurrencies are widely accepted. The hypothesis where CeBM is sidelined by 
cryptocurrencies would also pose a reputational risk to central banks as it could be detrimental to the 
concept of the unit of account,104 and may eventually result in the loss of central banks’ control over 
money supply. 
                                                 
97 Although each cryptocurrency (bitcoin) has a limit on its total number, there is no limit on the cryptocurrency brands that 
could be issued. Currently, there are more than 2,000 different cryptocurrencies and proliferation of such currencies are 
likely to lead to a suboptimal or unstable equilibria and affect price stability. See: Daniel R Sanches, "Bitcoin Vs. The Buck: 
Is Currency Competition a Good Thing?," Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Economic Insights Q2 2018  (2018): 13. 
98 Milton Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy," American Economic Review 58, no. 1 (1968).  
99 Dong He, "Monetary Policy in the Digital Age." 
100 George Selgin, "Synthetic Commodity Money," Journal of Financial Stability 17 (2015): 98. 
101 It is also unlikely that bitcoin becomes a substitute for CoBM, as the latter has its unique advantages serving various 
needs of a given economy. This analysis is only applicable to bitcoin because of its specific properties in terms of capped 
supply schedule, but it may not be applicable to other cryptocurrencies. However, most other cryptocurrencies (including 
algorithmic stablecoin projects) face limitations that puts a question mark on economic fundamentals and their adoption 
prospects. See: Fabian Schär and Aleksander Berentsen, "Stablecoins: The Quest for a Low-Volatility Cryptocurrency," in 
The Economics of Fintech and Digital Currencies, ed. Antonio Fatás (London: CEPR Presss, 2019). 
102 Max Raskin and David Yermack, "Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers, and the Future of Central Banking." 
However, as the development of banking and shadow banking around bitcoin cannot be ruled out, bitcoin may in the future 
directly compete against commercial bank, as well as shadow banking money. 
103 Eswar Prasad, "Central Banking in a Digital Age: Stock-Taking and Preliminary Thoughts," 14. 
104 European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes." 
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Although many studies contemplate that the cryptocurrencies can affect monetary policy,105 due to the 
relatively small size of the markets, thus far there has been no evidence of such an impact. However, 
there have been suggestions that a correlation exists between bitcoin price premia and global capital 
flows/flights.106 Although a correlation should not be mistaken for causation, it can serve as an early 
warning sign on which further focus would be warranted. Concerns about the disruption in the 
implementation of the monetary policy due to the wider adoption of cryptocurrencies would warrant 
central banks’ vigilance in closely watching the developments in this space. 
Thus far, we have discussed the direct effects of cryptocurrencies on central banking that would 
warrant their direct involvement in the cryptocurrency ecosystem. There are further second-order or 
indirect effects that could trigger central banks’ indirect involvement in cryptocurrency markets, but 
before discussing those challenges, it is important to discuss the policy options and tools at the ECB’s 
disposal to determine if the ECB can directly intervene in cryptocurrency markets. 
3. ECB’s policy options 
Although the intuitive knee-jerk reaction to the potential direct impact of cryptocurrencies on 
monetary policy and price stability would entail direct regulation of cryptocurrencies (e.g., banning 
such currencies), this paper argues that such a response would be neither feasible nor desirable. 
Instead, indirect regulation of cryptocurrencies through banking and payment systems would hold the 
promise of achieving the regulatory objectives without jeopardizing the potential benefits of fintech 
innovation. Based on the mandate and competences of the ECB, as well as the regulatory and 
supervisory tools at its disposal, it seems that many of the mechanisms for ECB intervention in the 
cryptocurrency ecosystem are among the mechanisms that only allow for the ECB’s indirect 
intervention. Within this indirect regulation, central banks can have a prominent role to play, 
particularly by their regulatory and oversight powers on the credit institutions and payment systems 
and their role as a contributor to the financial stability-enhancing policies. 
Direct and indirect regulatory measures can be either in the form of technical measures (i.e., non-
regulatory measures) or regulatory measures. A manifestation of direct regulatory measures by the 
ECB would be rejecting cryptocurrencies and digital assets as collateral (i.e., eligible marketable 
assets) within its collateral eligibility framework in the ECB operations. Furthermore, as a direct 
technical measure, the regulator may consider regulating the code itself and imposing design-based 
                                                 
105 Robleh Ali et al., "The Economics of Digital Currencies," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q3  (2014).; 
Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, "Digital Currencies,"  (2015). 
106 See: Bloomberg (2018), What Bitcoin Signals About Global Capital Flows, available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2017-09-29/what-bitcoin-signals-about-global-capital-flows-video. 
Among the ESCB’s basic tasks are conducting foreign-exchange operations, holding and managing the official foreign 
reserves of the Member States. Under this mandate, the ECB may be given the power to hold and intervene in 
cryptocurrencies. Such powers would be necessary for the successful implementation of monetary policy under the unlikely 
scenario of cryptocurrencies making international capital markets unrestricted. 
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requirements on the code or protocol. However, as far as the ECB is concerned, it would fall outside 
the scope of its mandate and competence. Indirect regulatory measures would be achieved largely by 
the regulatory and supervisory measures targeting banks and payment institutions, for example, 
imposing stricter criteria for access to the FMIs and technical platforms operated by the ECB on the 
banking and payment institutions providing payment services in cryptocurrencies. Finally, indirect 
technical measures would focus either on improving the efficiency and addressing the shortcomings 
of the existing payment and settlement systems, thereby indirectly influencing cryptocurrencies, or 
they would be aimed at venturing into the unchartered territory of issuing CBDCs, to which we will 
return in the final part of the paper.  
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3.1. Direct regulation of cryptocurrencies 
Based on the concerns about the unit of account, price stability and the impact on the conduct of 
monetary policy, central banks might take an interest in regulating cryptocurrencies directly. Direct 
regulation of cryptocurrencies can take many forms. It could involve regulating the code or protocol 
(i.e., design-based regulation),107 developers,108 the design features of a given blockchain, node 
operators, wallet providers,109 miners, and users, or imposing rules and standards for governing white 
papers. On the contrary, regulation of exchanges, where cryptocurrencies are exchanged for fiat 
money, custodians (including custodian wallet providers) and other service providers, such as 
merchant acceptance facilities would belong to the realm of indirect regulation. 
An example of direct regulatory intervention may include imposing a blanket ban on cryptocurrencies 
and sanctioning the individuals, exchanges, financial institutions, and payment processors from 
handling or dealing in cryptocurrencies.110 On the other extreme of the spectrum, the ECB may be 
given the power to hold cryptocurrencies as part of its tasks under conducting foreign-exchange 
operations or holding and managing the official foreign reserves of the Member States. As the ECB 
and NCBs can “acquire and sell spot and forward all types of foreign exchange assets and precious 
metals”,111 and as ‘foreign exchange assets’ include “securities and all other assets in the currency of 
any country or units of account and in whatever form held”,112 it would be difficult to argue that the 
ECB would not have the power to acquire and hold cryptocurrencies if need be.113 
As certain forms of direct regulation of cryptocurrencies would rely on design-based regulation, this 
approach cannot be independent of the specific features of the cryptocurrency in question and its 
underlying blockchain. For example, cryptocurrencies based on an open (unrestricted) blockchain are 
to be treated differently from those built on a closed (restricted) blockchain with identifiable and 
relatively centralized nodes. In the same vein, largely centralized cryptocurrency schemes, such as 
Ripple, should be treated differently from decentralized ones such as bitcoin. The dependence of 
direct regulatory approach on the design features of the specific cryptocurrency poses a serious 
                                                 
107 For the concept of design-based regulation and examples thereof, see: Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of 
Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999).; Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006).; 
Primavera De Filippi and Aaron Wright, Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2018).; ; Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," The Journal of Legal Studies 27, no. S2 (1998). 
108 Angela Walch, "In Code(Rs) We Trust: Software Developers as Fiduciaries in Public Blockchains," in Regulating 
Blockchain: Techno-Social and Legal Challenges, ed. Philipp  Hacker, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming 
2019). For a dissenting view, see: Aaron  van Wirdum, "A Primer on Bitcoin Governance, or Why Developers Aren’t in 
Charge of the Protocol," BITCOINMAGAZINESept. 7, 2016.; See also: Jerry Brito and Peter van Valkenburgh, "Writing and 
Publishing Code Alone Cannot Be a Crime," CoinCenter.org  (Octover 29, 2018). 
109 Such wallet providers could be regulated as Money Service Businesses (MSBs) requiring money transmitter license, or 
money remittance service providers, both of which are equivalent to payment institutions in the EU. 
110 Global Legal Research Directorate Staff of the Library of Congress, "Regulation of Cryptocurrency in Selected 
Jurisdictions," (Washington D.C.,: The Law Library of Congress, June 2018). See China entry by Laney Zhang. 
111 Art. 23 ESCB Statute 
112 Art. 23 ESCB Statute 
113 If bitcoin becomes a major currency in the future, central banks may engage in buying and intervening in the bitcoin 
markets under the mandate of managing their foreign reserves. As this scenario appears to be unlikely at the moment, this 
paper will not discuss it.  
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challenge to direct regulation approach as recent proliferation of cryptoassets with various features 
would make direct regulation of cryptocurrencies an arduous task. 
For tokens issued on permissioned distributed ledgers, direct regulation would be straightforward, as 
it can target the proprietors of the ledger or the nodes with access to the ledger and the authority to 
validate it. Therefore, for centralized cryptocurrencies, mandatory creation of a scheme governance 
authority (body), information technology (IT) security requirements, requirements on transaction 
verification process (e.g., the number of nodes and miners and confirmations needed for the finality of 
a transactions on the blockchain) can be imposed by the law to be built into the design of a given 
cryptocurrency. Operational and business continuity requirements, disclosure of the identity of node 
operators, requirements such as investor or user vetting process or customer due diligence before 
making the wallet or coin available to the user can be imposed directly on these identifiable scheme 
authorities. Although imposing most of the aforementioned requirements would go far beyond the 
existing scope of competence of the ECB, the ECB can have a role in its advisory capacity. 
Despite the fact that many cryptocurrencies designed to be decentralized and censorship-resistant, 
those features do not necessarily mean that direct regulation of cryptocurrencies is destined to fail or 
be ineffective. Although governments can hardly do away with decentralized cryptocurrencies, they 
can disrupt their growth. As with all currencies, the success of any currency depends on its 
widespread adoption, which entails network effects. However, a government ban on cryptocurrencies 
can severely undermine their network effects.114 In addition, an aggressive tax policy, such as 
designating bitcoin as property for tax purposes and imposing property taxes each time a bitcoin or a 
fraction of it changes hands, as it is the case in some jurisdictions, would severely stifle its adoption as 
a medium of exchange. 
3.2. Challenges to direct regulation and opportunities for indirect 
regulation of cryptocurrencies 
There are several reasons justifying that direct regulation of cryptocurrencies by central banks may 
not be desirable, or even possible, and may eventually fail to achieve the intended goals. 
First, decentralized cryptocurrencies are borderless and direct regulation would encourage regulatory 
arbitrage. This is due to two main issues. First, no government can effectively ban a sufficiently 
decentralized cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin. Due to the P2P nature of Bitcoin, banning or 
aggressively regulating it will presumably only push it to the darker corners of the virtual world. 
                                                 
114 William J. Luther, "Cryptocurrencies, Network Effects, and Switching Costs," Contemporary Economic Policy 34, no. 3 
(2016). (In Luther’s view, governments are capable of undermining bitcoin due to their ability in stifling network effects. He 
also is of the opinion that in the absence of major breakthroughs, it is unlikely that bitcoin would gain widespread adoption.) 
On the other side of the spectrum, some believe that profit seeking incentives of entrepreneurs can contribute to the 
widespread adoption of bitcoin. See: Malavika Nair and Nicolás Cachanosky, "Bitcoin and Entrepreneurship: Breaking the 
Network Effect," The Review of Austrian Economics 30, no. 3 (2017). 
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Second, if only a few jurisdictions allow Bitcoin, such a ban would become ineffective because of 
regulatory arbitrage. The relatively decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies, their digital nature, their 
global reach, and the young and nimble industries that are being evolved within this ecosystem create 
border problems115 and a wide scope for regulatory arbitrage across borders.116 In the cryptocurrency 
sphere, if a cryptocurrency is legally allowed only in one jurisdiction, it is likely that it would spread 
across borders in the virtual world. This has already been the case in the regulator’s cat and mouse 
game in the area of illegal download websites and decentralized protocols for P2P file sharing such as 
BitTorrent.117 In the context of cryptocurrencies, after the New York BitLicense, there have been 
reports of businesses, including exchanges, that changed their domicile with unprecedented pace.118 In 
2017, a year in which the Bank of China took actions to regulate and ban ICOs, cryptocurrency 
markets witnessed a shift in the global trading volume from Chinese Yuan (CNY) to Japanese Yen 
(JPY) and US dollar (USD). 
 
 
Second, the one-size-fits-all measures typical of direct regulation cannot adequately address the wide 
variety and heterogeneity of cryptocurrencies and the strategies of the businesses evolving around 
them.119 There is a plethora of actors playing distinct roles in the cryptocurrency sphere. They include 
developers, issuers, miners, processing service providers, users, wallet providers, exchanges, and 
                                                 
115 Charles A. E. Goodhart and Rosa M. Lastra, "Border Problems," Journal of International Economic Law 13, no. 3 
(2010).; Charles Goodhart, "The Boundary Problem in Financial Regulation," National Institute Economic Review 206, no. 1 
(2008). 
116 For the concept of regulatory arbitrage, see: Hossein Nabilou, "Regulatory Arbitrage and Hedge Fund Regulation: The 
Need for a Transnational Response," Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 22, no. 4 (2017). 
117 Primavera De Filippi and Samer Hassan, "Blockchain Technology as a Regulatory Technology: From Code Is Law to 
Law Is Code," First Monday 21, no. 12 (2016). 
118 For example, the two exchanges that shifted their businesses offshore or to other states were Kraken and Shapeshift 
119 See: Hossein Nabilou and Alessio M. Pacces, "The Hedge Fund Regulation Dilemma: Direct Vs. Indirect Regulation." 
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other trading platforms such as decentralized exchanges (DEX),120 merchant acceptance facilities, and 
various other actors.121 To say the least, due to various design features of emerging cryptocurrencies, a 
one-size-fits-all regulatory solution could at best be counterproductive. 
The main problem with direct regulation of cryptocurrencies is that decentralized permissionless 
blockchain-based cryptocurrencies - designed to be censorship resistant - are antithetical to the 
existing structure of financial regulation. These cryptocurrencies can exist and function independently 
of the existing institutions and market infrastructures and they may not fit into any existing legal 
framework. The issue becomes even more complicated as some issuing organizations have neither 
managers nor real or corporate entity and place of domicile.122 Therefore, the direct regulation of 
cryptocurrencies, to the extent possible, would run into the practical question of what or whom to 
regulate and in the absence of a centralized governance scheme, it is hard to propose a direct 
regulatory approach to regulating cryptocurrencies.123  
The closest that regulations can get in regulating such cryptocurrencies is regulating miners, and 
perhaps relatively centralized nodes on the Lightning Network124 if that network proves its long-term 
viability. Indeed, as the second-layer solutions are being developed, it is reasonable to expect business 
communities to develop around them which could be directly identifiable and targeted by regulators. 
However, under the current legal framework, the ECB may lack the competence to regulate or 
influence node operators directly if such operators are not part of credit institutions or payment 
systems. The ECB may only do so through indirect channels, where regulation would focus on the 
applications, use-cases, and businesses that are being developed around the open-source 
cryptocurrency protocols.125 
Third, a more interesting feature of indirect regulation that makes it particularly suitable for the 
regulation of cryptocurrencies is its relatively decentralized nature.126 In this respect, crafting 
appropriate indirect regulatory mechanisms for cryptocurrencies requires identifying the financial 
institutions that have the most consistent, continuous, and day-to-day relationships with 
                                                 
120 For more details on DEX, see: Lindsay X. Lin, "Deconstructing Decentralized Exchanges," Stanford Journal of 
Blockchain Law & Policy  (2019). 
121 For a detailed description, see; European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes- a Further Analysis," 7-8. 
122 Office of the New York State Attorney General, "Virtual Markets Integrity Initiative Report." 
123 Yves Mersch, "Virtual Currencies Ante Portas," Speech at the 39th meeting of the Governor’s Club Bodrum, Turkey,14 
May 2018  (14 May 2018). 
124 Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja, "The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments,"  (2016).; 
Aaron van Wirdum, "The History of Lightning: From Brainstorm to Beta," Bitcoin Magazine  (4 April 2018). 
125 For similar ideas in a slightly different context, see: Michèle Finck, "Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown," German 
Law Journal 19, no. 4 (2018): 689.; Julie Maupin, "Mapping the Global Legal Landscape of Blockchain and Other 
Distributed Ledger Technologies," Centre for International Governance Innovation Papaers No. 149  (2017). 
There are improvements on the Bitcoin protocol and also second layer solutions that promise to make bitcoin useful for all 
the above-mentioned purposes. For an overview of two such business improvements called “market exchange pricing”, and 
“instantaneous exchange facilities”, see: William Luther and Lawrence White, "Can Bitcoin Become a Major Currency?," 
JMU Working Paper in Economics No. 14-17  (2014). See also: Jimmy Song, "Bits Denomination Bip," GitHub, 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0176.mediawiki. 
126 For the concept of decentralized regulation, see: Julia Black, "Decentring Regulation: The Role of Regulation and Self 
Regulation in a ‘‘Post Regulatory’’ World," Current Legal Problems 54, no. 1 (2001). 
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cryptocurrencies. Identifying these institutions means identifying those equipped with sufficient 
knowledge and understanding of the industry and their activities in the financial markets.127 These are 
the very institutions that can potentially be used as ‘surrogate regulators’ delegated with regulatory 
functions from the government agencies. In addition to increasing the efficiency of regulation by 
providing incentives to surrogate regulators to compete with each other, since indirect regulation of 
cryptocurrencies would be implemented by various multiple banks and payment institutions, it 
provides for the possibility of decentralized implementation and enforcement of rules that are initially 
applied to the banking and payment sectors. This can help mitigate the knowledge problem that exists 
in most centralized regulatory agencies and make regulation less vulnerable to regulatory capture. 
In the following sections, we study the potential impact of cryptocurrencies on banking and payment 
systems and the venues for the implementation of indirect regulatory measures towards 
cryptocurrencies by the ECB by focusing on its regulatory, supervisory and oversight powers over 
credit institutions and payment systems. The final section will be dedicated to the indirect technical 
measures that can be taken to address certain risks posed by cryptocurrencies to central banking. 
3.3. Indirect regulation through banking and payment systems 
The predominant features of decentralized and permissionless cryptocurrencies, the limitations of 
direct regulation and the constraints on the ECB’s scope of competence mean that indirect regulation 
of cryptocurrencies would be the most feasible and effective regulatory approach.128 Indirect 
regulation of cryptocurrencies would circumvent the difficulties of direct regulation and instead 
relegate them to a network of decentralized banks and payment institutions to address those 
problems.129 For example, instead of regulation of tokens issued on permissionless blockchains, 
indirect regulation may focus on the regulation of wallet providers or exchanges, which could be a 
more practical solution.130 In this case, regulation targets the interface between cyberspace and real 
                                                 
127 In this sense, indirect regulation becomes very similar to regulation by standards, because it relies on decentralized 
knowledge. For more information about how standards involve utilizing such knowledge. See Hans-Bernd Schaefer, "Legal 
Rule and Standards," in The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Volume I, ed. Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (New 
York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004). See also in general: F. A. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," The 
American Economic Review 35, no. 4 (1945). 
128 Bank for International Settlements, "Cryptocurrencies: Looking Beyond the Hype," 107. 
129 Sanctions regimes, where the indirect regulation has proven its relative effectiveness, is a case in point. Within such 
regimes, where the activity in question is out of reach of the regulator, the regulator targets the industry upon which it has 
jurisdiction, and sanctions the transactions between the regulated entities and those outside its regulatory reach (also known 
as secondary boycotts or sanctions). This regulatory approach aims at minimizing the amount of the sanctioned activity. See:  
Kern Alexander, Economic Sanctions: Law and Public Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 15. 
130 Jason Albert, "What’s Next for Blockchain: Technology, Economics and Regulation," Microsoft: EU Policy Blog  (June 
20, 2016). The existing examples of this approach are the warnings issued by regulators (such as the EBA and the 
Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF) of Luxembourg) discouraging banks that engage or plan to engage 
in cryptocurrency business from doing so. 
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world. This is in line with the old tradition in financial regulation where the regulation of financial 
markets and institutions has relied on gatekeepers.131 
With respect to indirect regulation, although regulation may not be able to touch the Bitcoin Network 
itself, it applies at the use-case levels132 and regulates the entities and intermediaries that enable the 
interface and interaction between cryptocurrencies and fiat currencies on cryptocurrencies schemes 
with bidirectional flows.133 In the future, there would be several scenarios in which banks might 
engage in payment services using bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies. For example, as second-layer 
payment solutions are being developed for bitcoin, banks might engage in the second-layer payment 
channels by running full nodes on the Lightning Network, essentially providing liquidity in bitcoin.134 
Whether running such nodes and engaging in transactions in the second-layer payment channels 
would mean that the bank engages in the provision of retail payment services and the application of 
payment laws should be triggered, and whether protocol layer payments qualify as (wholesale) 
payments system remain open questions. For the purposes of this paper, it seems that such 
developments would enable regulators to focus on the relatively centralized nodes on such networks. 
The role of indirect regulation is particularly important in the context of emerging smart contracts on 
cryptocurrency schemes and their blockchains. The execution of such contracts is often dependent on 
the external validation of specific factual events (e.g., the actual transfer of the personal property), 
which are necessarily determined by trusted intermediaries (i.e., oracles).135 In these cases, not only 
can reliance on oracles reduce the level of trustlessness of transactions on the blockchain, but they 
also become choke points, where law can target blockchain transactions. In addition to the oracles, 
which facilitate onchain transactions, indirect regulation, which targets intermediaries, can best be 
applied to off-chain transactions, where intermediaries are involved in the transaction and transaction 
is not broadcast to the blockchain. In contrast, in most on-chain transactions, where no intermediary is 
involved and no external validation is required, indirect regulation would be of limited use.  
4. The ECB, payment systems and cryptocurrencies 
Ensuring price stability requires the central bank to have mechanisms at its disposal to control 
inflation and exchange rate and to supervise the banking system as it plays a significant role in money 
creation and as a transmission belt for monetary policy. Accordingly, every legal system affords 
central banks with tools to operationalize such mechanisms and achieve the price stability objective. 
                                                 
131 Despite the merits of this regulatory approach in that it is directed to identifiable entities, the problem of regulatory 
arbitrage would still be an obstacle to the success of such a regulatory approach. 
132 Phoebus L. Athanassiou, Digital Innovation in Financial Services: Legal Challenges and Regulatory Policy Issues, 38. 
133 Ibid., 88. 
134 For the scaling solutions by using the Lightning Network see: Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja, "The Bitcoin Lightning 
Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments."; For a critique of the Lightning Network on liquidity grounds, see: Frances 
Coppola, "Lightning Network May Not Solve Bitcoin's Scaling 'Trilemma'," CoindeskJanuary 20, 2018. 
135 Primavera De Filippi and Samer Hassan, "Blockchain Technology as a Regulatory Technology: From Code Is Law to 
Law Is Code." 
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For example, controlling inflation requires monetary policy tools and since an efficient and well-
functioning payment, clearing and settlement system plays a critical role in the operational efficiency 
of the monetary policy transmission,136 and as such is crucial to the success of the ECB’s monetary 
policy and price stability objectives, the provision, regulation and oversight of the payment system 
have also been included in the basic tasks of the ECB.137  
The ESCB’s competence in the area of payments includes ensuring safe and efficient payment 
systems, which consists of making regulation, the provision of facilities, and the exercise of oversight 
powers.138 Within this system, the Eurosystem has the authority both in a centralized and 
decentralized manner (by the ECB and NCBs respectively) to oversee retail and wholesale payment 
systems.139 More rigorous oversight standards are applicable to the systemically important payment 
systems, including the systemically important retail payment systems (SIRPS).140 In what follows, we 
highlight the increasing interconnectedness between conventional payment systems and 
cryptocurrencies that would affect conventional payment systems and eventually trigger action by 
central banks. 
4.1. Emerging interconnections between conventional payment systems 
and cryptocurrencies 
Risks in payment systems include credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk, and systemic 
risk.141 To address such risks, payment systems in Europe rest on an edifice of robust institutional and 
legal infrastructure.142 In addition to the laws and regulations regarding the retail payment systems, 
there is a well-established legal framework, including ECB guidelines and decisions, for the 
wholesale payment systems to address operational, liquidity and counterparty risks as well as 
                                                 
136 Sheller K. Hanspeter, The European Central Bank: History, Role and Functions, 86. 
137 European Central Bank, The Payment System: Payments, Securities and Derivatives, and the Role of the Eurosystem, 
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138 Ibid., 309. 
139 European Central Bank, "Revised Oversight Framework for Retail Payment Systems," (Frankfurt am MainFebruary 
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140 Ibid., 3. See also: Recital 7 of the Regulation of the ECB on oversight requirements for systemically important payment 
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Working Paper Series No 16  (October 2017): 16-18. 
142 These regulations are collectively to address the problems arising from information asymmetry (consumer protection, 
e.g., prohibition on blending in interchange fees), enhancing competition among payment service providers (PSPs), and 
among PSPs, banks and Third Party Payment Service Providers (TPPs) (e.g., interchange fee regulation, promoting 
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the systemic risks in the wholesale payments). An additional set of directives and regulation attempts to address concerns 
about financial crime using payment system (e.g., AML, CFT, KYC regulations), access to payment accounts (payment 
accounts directive), user protection, by imposing asset segregation rules and limitations on fees, and ensuring finality of 
transactions and ultimately the trust in the payments system to achieve payment system stability objective. 
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settlement finality risks.143 However, this legal framework does not apply to payments using 
cryptocurrencies.144 
Against the backdrop of a near-consensus about the inapplicability of the current prudential 
requirements to payments made by cryptocurrencies, current developments suggest that 
cryptocurrency service providers are increasingly becoming intertwined with conventional payment 
institutions. In addition to technological developments, this is partly due to semantics and definitional 
problems in payments law. The regulatory framework for payment institutions in Europe (e.g., 
Payment Services Directive 2; hereinafter, PSD2)145 relegates the authorization of payment 
institutions to the competent authorities of the home Member State.146 Some cryptocurrency 
exchanges, which also provide the possibility of cross-border transfers of cryptocurrencies across 
wallets and across exchanges, have been authorized as ‘payment institutions’ in certain Member 
States. For example, cryptocurrency exchanges such as Bitstamp Europe S.A. and bitFlyer Europe 
S.A. are licensed as payment institutions in Luxembourg, however, there is no clarity about the legal 
basis for granting such authorizations.147 
PSD2 defines a payment institution as “a legal person that has been granted authorisation …. to 
provide and execute payment services throughout the Union.”148 [Emphasis added.] Therefore, the 
definition of a payment system largely relies on the definition of ‘payment services’ in the PSD2. The 
Annex I of the PSD2 defines payment services as services enabling cash placement or withdrawal on 
or from a payment account, “as well as all the operations required for operating a payment account.” 
                                                 
143 In particular, this framework is of utmost importance in systemically important payment systems (SIPS) and in wholesale 
payment systems such as Target2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System), T2S 
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In addition, execution of ‘payment transactions’, and money remittance also fall under the definition 
of payment services.149  
PSD2 defines ‘payment transaction’ as “an act, initiated by the payer or on his behalf or by the payee, 
of placing, transferring or withdrawing funds, irrespective of any underlying obligations between the 
payer and the payee”.150 Therefore, it seems that the issue comes down to the definitions of the words 
‘cash’, ‘fund’ and ‘money’. As cryptocurrencies cannot be classified as cash or money, the closest 
term that could be associated with cryptocurrencies is the term ‘fund’. PSD2 defines funds as 
“banknotes and coins, scriptural money or electronic money as defined in point (2) of Article 2 of 
Directive 2009/110/EC”.151 As bitcoin is neither a banknote nor a coin, nor is it scriptural money,152 
the closest concept can be electronic money (e-money). The e-money directive153 defines electronic 
money as “electronically, including magnetically, stored monetary value as represented by a claim on 
the issuer which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of making payment transactions …, and 
which is accepted by a natural or legal person other than the electronic money issuer”.154 As bitcoin 
does not represent any claim, classification of bitcoin as e-money would be a mistake.155 
As the above analysis suggests, under the current legal framework for payments in Europe, 
cryptocurrencies cannot fall under the definitional scope of funds,156 putting a question mark on the 
applicability of European payment directives and regulations to cryptocurrency exchanges. Even 
assuming the full applicability of the payment services laws to the cryptocurrency exchanges, such 
exchanges would be subject to idiosyncratic risks that would not be covered under the current legal 
regime applicable to payment institutions and systems. The two such idiosyncratic risks are the risks 
associated with the reliance of cryptocurrency exchanges on illiquid and volatile settlement assets 
whose convertibility to CeBM is not guaranteed and the risks associated with the settlement finality 
within certain major cryptocurrency blockchains. 
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4.1.1. The volatility of the settlement asset 
In addition to the fixed supply schedule of certain cryptocurrencies, as the cryptocurrency exchanges 
offer bidirectional flows between fiat money and cryptocurrencies, market participants have an easy 
way out to fiat money, which could give rise to the extreme volatility of the settlement asset in 
cryptocurrency payment systems in times of illiquidity. The problem would arise if licensed 
cryptocurrency exchanges use relatively illiquid and highly volatile cryptocurrencies as their 
settlement asset over which neither the ECB nor the NCBs have any control. Where the 
cryptocurrency exchanges licensed as payment institutions, which are intertwined with the regulated 
payment institutions and use illiquid, highly volatile and unconvertible settlement assets without 
access to the LOLR, become large enough, they would effectively function as contagion channels for 
liquidity crises from the cryptocurrency ecosystems to conventional banking and payment systems.157 
Needless to say, the increasing number of payment institution licenses granted to cryptocurrency 
exchanges would increase the magnitude of the exposure of the conventional payment systems to 
cryptocurrency payments to the extent cryptocurrency and payment activities are not separate, which 
could ultimately draw central banks’ interest in regulating cryptocurrencies. In this case, one policy 
option for central banks or other NCAs would be to require the separation of cryptocurrency payment 
systems from conventional regulated payment systems on prudential grounds.158 In addition, the ECB 
may cut access to its infrastructure for the credit and payment institutions that have exposures to 
cryptocurrency exchanges or payment institutions. 
In addition to risks associated with the settlement asset, cryptocurrency payments are mainly gross 
and (near) real time. Hence, they may be subject to substantial liquidity risks. Concerns about 
liquidity risks have been raised about bitcoin in the sense that it is impossible to have full 
decentralization, fixed money supply, and sufficient liquidity simultaneously.159 Although 
cryptocurrencies would be prone to liquidity risks, as of yet, there have been no documented risks to 
the conventional payment systems posed by illiquidity in cryptocurrencies. However, the involvement 
of banks in cryptocurrency payment systems might result in risk spillovers from the latter to the 
former. 
4.1.2. Finality of settlements  
Another major risk about the payments made by cryptocurrencies, which may not be covered by the 
existing payments law, concerns the probabilistic finality of certain cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin. 
The finality of payments and settlements on the Bitcoin blockchain is probabilistic due to the 
likelihood that the most recent transactions embedded in the blockchain may be undone, or bitcoins 
                                                 
157 In addition, the failure of such cryptocurrency payment institutions/exchanges would also pose reputational risks to the 
EU license brand of payment institutions.  
158 European Banking Authority, "Eba Opinion on 'Virtual Currencies'." 
159 Frances Coppola, "Lightning Network May Not Solve Bitcoin's Scaling 'Trilemma'." 
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may be double-spent mainly due to formation of a fork.160 This probability is a function of the block 
height, meaning that the probability of undoing transactions embedded in the blockchain depends on 
how deep the transaction is recorded in the blockchain. As more and more blocks are built on the 
Bitcoin blockchain, the lower the probability of undoing the embedded transactions, and as it gets 
deeper and deeper in the blockchain, the probability becomes infinitesimal as the PoW algorithm of 
the Bitcoin protocol ensures that the extrinsic investment in expended energy would act as a 
‘thermodynamic guarantee of immutability’.161 Therefore, it is safe to assume that the transactions are 
de facto ‘final’ after six confirmations, as undoing six blocks requires a very high investment in 
energy.162 To reduce the uncertainty about the settlement finality especially within the first sixty 
minutes, the industry has developed its own commercial customs. Depending on the wallet used, as 
soon as a transaction is broadcast to the Bitcoin Blockchain, the receiving wallet receives a 
notification confirming the receipt of a payment, but the payment is considered final after six 
confirmations.  
In the debate about the probabilistic finality, it is important, however, not to confuse two different 
aspects of transaction finality: actual, technical, or de facto finality, and legal or de jure finality. The 
technical settlements on the Bitcoin blockchain is probabilistic, and so is the actual settlement with 
cash and any other means of electronic payments, as there is always the possibility of taking the cash 
back by using brute force or reversing the transaction due to a technical failure in the payment system, 
including that of a central bank. However, the near impossibility of a de facto finality does not 
necessarily mean that the payment is not legally final, in the sense that legal challenges cannot 
invalidate the payment ex-post. In other words, de facto probabilistic finality does not necessarily 
mean de jure probabilistic finality and vice versa.163 The difference between settlements with 
conventional payments vis-à-vis the settlements within the blockchain with probabilistic finality is 
that the settlement on the conventional payment systems enjoys legal protections, whereas there is no 
legal protection as to the finality of the settlements on the Bitcoin blockchain.  
Although the case law may evolve and presume settlement finality after six confirmations for private-
law purposes, given the potential for systemic risk arising from the ambiguity as to the finality of 
payments, such issues may be better dealt with ex-ante within a regulatory framework, as is the case 
                                                 
160 Bank for International Settlements, "Cryptocurrencies: Looking Beyond the Hype," 101-04. 
161 (Andreas Antonopoulos) – proof of work; Let’s talk bitcoin #368 the internet of money & 
https://vevo.site/video/Bw3-Waz04X8/andreas-antonopoulos-talks-bitcoin-blockchain-and-beyond.html. Aside from the 
expenditure on energy, the tamper-resistant feature of bitcoin is built on certain assumptions about rational and profit-
maximizing miners. Therefore, the tamper-resistant feature of bitcoin is as much a technological concept as it is an economic 
concept, making bitcoin’s tamper-resistance a relative concept rather than an absolute one. Hence, the term ‘tamper-
resistance’ would be a preferable to ‘immutable’ in describing what is known as immutability of the Bitcoin Blockchain.   
162 This is not to say that it amounts to complete immutability. Theoretically complete immutability cannot be achieved. 
163 In fact, technically speaking, in most transactions, the real world may not provide a solid 100% certainty; therefore, there 
is a need for the law to intervene and presume that as soon as certain requirements are met, a transaction would be deemed 
final. As on the Bitcoin Blockchain, similar to any other payment system, the actual transfers are not 100% final and 
immutable, but the law may presume that at certain point in time a transaction becomes final. In other words, the fact that the 
finality on the Bitcoin Blockchain is not deterministic does not stop the law to presume the finality of a transaction on its  
blockchain. 
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with conventional payment and settlement systems. However, under the current payments law, the 
laws ensuring settlement finality (e.g., the Settlement Finality Directive),164 which require payment 
and settlement systems to specifically define the moment of entry and irrevocability of the orders and 
transactions, do not seem to be applicable to payments made by cryptocurrencies.165 The lack of legal 
protection in itself may entail systemic implications if the cryptocurrency markets become sufficiently 
large and more sophisticated products and services develop around them.166  
5. The ECB, banking stability and cryptocurrencies 
Banks and cryptocurrencies have an uneasy relationship. On the one hand, there is a likelihood that 
the cryptocurrency-related businesses would grab part of the business of banking. For example, it 
seems that the first line of business of traditional banking, which is more likely to fall victim to 
cryptocurrencies, is the provision of payment services, especially correspondent-banking model of 
international fund transfers. On the other hand, to avoid such an outcome, banks might take a 
proactive approach and coopt cryptocurrency business, even in the provision of payment services.  
There are many channels through which banks may involve in cryptocurrency activities. Examples 
would include direct ownership of cryptocurrencies, market making, lending against cryptocurrency 
collateral, engaging in clearing of trading cryptocurrency derivative instruments, lending to 
cryptocurrency businesses, underwriting ICOs, and providing custody wallet or trading platforms in 
cryptocurrencies.167 An exhaustive treatment of the dynamics of the interaction between 
cryptocurrencies and banks goes well beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to mention that such 
business activities may pose new risks to the banking system. As banks play an important role in 
money creation and allocation of credit as well as in the transmission of monetary policy, a disruption 
in the banking system can have significant consequences for the supply of money and credit, price 
stability, and the implementation of monetary policy, which may warrant the ECB’s attention to the 
risks involved in the interaction of cryptocurrencies and banks. Here, we discuss a few hypothetical 
scenarios about the interaction of the banking system with the cryptocurrency ecosystem in the future, 
the potential risks arising from such interactions, and the potential venues for ECB intervention. 
The first venue for banks to engage in cryptocurrency business is through the recent developments in 
the scaling issues related to cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin by engaging in the business opportunities 
that are emerging around those new developments. From its earliest days of bitcoin, scaling issues 
                                                 
164 Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and 
securities settlement systems, OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45–50. (Settlement Finality Directive) 
165 See: Arts. 1 & 2 of the Settlement Finality Directive.  
166 The lack of such legal protections may cast a shadow of doubt on the decisions to grant payment institution licence to 
cryptocurrency exchanges and payment service providers. 
167 European Banking Authority, "Report with Advice for the European Commission on Crypto-Assets," 22-23. 
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have been a constant concern that led to polarizing controversies in the bitcoin community.168 Two 
main camps emerged on this dividing issue; one supporting vertical scaling solutions or second-layer 
solutions,169 the other camp supporting horizontal scaling solutions or increasing the block size.170 The 
ensuing civil war among the bitcoin community resulted in the failed SegWit2X, and a hard fork 
leading to the creation of bitcoin cash (BCH) and subsequent user activated soft fork (UASF) and the 
activation of SegWit on the legacy chain.171 Through time, it seems that within the bitcoin community 
vertical scaling solutions to address Bitcoin’s scalability problem is gaining traction.172  
The second-layer solutions to Bitcoin’s scalability problem are not new phenomena and have already 
been in the making from the early days of bitcoin. Fractional reserve banking on bitcoin can be 
considered as an early example of such a scaling solution to bitcoin. In the words of Hal Finney:  
“… there is a very good reason for Bitcoin-backed banks to exist, issuing their own digital 
cash currency, redeemable for bitcoins. Bitcoin itself cannot scale to have every single 
financial transaction in the world be broadcast to everyone and included in the block chain. 
There needs to be a secondary level of payment systems which is lighter weight and more 
efficient. Likewise, the time needed for Bitcoin transactions to finalize will be impractical for 
medium to large value purchases. Bitcoin backed banks will solve these problems. They can 
work like banks did before nationalization of currency. Different banks can have different 
policies... Some would be fractional reserve while others may be 100% Bitcoin backed. 
Interest rates may vary… I believe this will be the ultimate fate of Bitcoin, to be the "high-
powered money" that serves as a reserve currency for banks that issue their own digital cash. 
Most Bitcoin transactions will occur between banks, to settle net transfers….”173 
In addition to banks and exchanges, bitcoin custody-solution providers and bitcoin debit-card 
providers – which allow the transfers of a bitcoin from a wallet to another within or across companies 
without using the Bitcoin blockchain - can be considered as part of the second-layer scaling solutions 
for Bitcoin.  
                                                 
168 Bitcoin itself can be viewed as an invention that emerged to overcome social scalability problem in the first place. 
Although the discussion of this paper is limited to technological scalability, the problem of social scalability stands at the 
core of the scalability issues in bitcoin. Indeed, the perceived inefficiencies in the PoW can be understood in the balance 
struck between social scalability and computational scalability. In the Bitcoin Blockchain the latter is sacrificed to improve 
the former. For more details, see: Nick Szabo, "Money, Blockchains, and Social Scalability," Unenumerated  (February 09, 
2017). 
169 See: Andreas M. Antonopoulos, Mastering Bitcoin: Programming the Open Blockchian (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly 
Media, Inc.,, 2017), 300-21. 
170 See: Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja, "The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments."; Aaron 
van Wirdum, "The History of Lightning: From Brainstorm to Beta."; Tom Elvis  Jedusor, "Mimblewimble,"  (19 July 2016).; 
Aaron van Wirdum, "Mimblewimble: How a Stripped-Down Version of Bitcoin Could Improve Privacy, Fungibility and 
Scalability All at Once," Bitcoin Magazine  (12 August 2016). 
171 Laura Shin, "Will This Battle for the Soul of Bitcoin Destroy It?," ForbesOct. 23, 2017.. Similar controversies happened 
on the Ethereum’ blockchain due to the loss of funds associated with DAO project, resulting in a chain split and the creation 
of Ethereum and the Ethereum Classic. 
172 See: Andreas M. Antonopoulos, Mastering Bitcoin: Programming the Open Blockchian, 300-21. 
From these new solutions, the Lightning Network, Liquid Network, Sidechains, and other scaling solutions such as 
Mimblewimble stand out. See: Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja, "The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain 
Instant Payments."; Aaron van Wirdum, "The History of Lightning: From Brainstorm to Beta."; Tom Elvis  Jedusor, 
"Mimblewimble."; Aaron van Wirdum, "Mimblewimble: How a Stripped-Down Version of Bitcoin Could Improve Privacy, 
Fungibility and Scalability All at Once." 
173 Hal Finney, "Re: Bitcoin Bank," (December 30, 2010). 
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Within the development of the second layer on Bitcoin, bank involvement in cryptocurrencies could 
take various forms. Banks would operate on the additional layer on the Bitcoin blockchain and the 
Bitcoin’s base layer itself would function as the highly secure base or settlement layer for the net 
settlement of the financial obligations arising from the financial transactions conducted on Bitcoin’s 
upper layers. Banks and payment service providers may also evolve into wallet providers, custodians, 
and node operators supporting payment channels within the Lightning Network. 
However, the second layer payment channels within the Lightning Network may pose different 
challenges, such as liquidity risks, that would warrant special scrutiny if banking entities would run 
full nodes or otherwise engage in liquidity provision on the Network. In addition, the transactions on 
the Lightning Network may provide for higher levels of privacy compared to on-chain transactions. 
Although the concerns about the liquidity may warrant ECB’s involvement in the regulation through 
discouraging the banking entities in engaging in such activities, the privacy of payments would 
require regulators’ - other than central banks - intervention. 
Second, banks may start accepting bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies as deposits174 and as deposit-
taking institutions, they may pay interest on the cryptocurrency deposits, or eventually, develop a 
fractional reserve banking model on bitcoin.175 Although at the time of this writing, the banking sector 
does not engage in borrowing and lending cryptocurrencies,176 this may be subject to change in the 
future, despite all the risks involved in such transactions. The engagement of banks in borrowing and 
lending in cryptocurrencies would pose two distinct prudential questions: first, the acceptability of 
cryptocurrencies as collateral and quantitative and qualitative standards to be used to determine 
haircuts in accepting their use and reuse as collateral both in the banking industry and in monetary 
policy operations of central banks.  
The second problem would be associated with the absence of LOLR in cryptocurrencies. As fractional 
reserve banking on bitcoin would result in liquidity problems, the absence of a LOLR would become 
palatable. In the eurozone, the ECB and NCBs have offered LOLR services (equivalent to Fed’s 
discount window) through the marginal lending facility.177 The reason that the ECB or NCBs can 
offer such a service is that it has access to unlimited sources of liquidity. The predetermined supply 
schedule and fixed money supply model of cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin remove the possibility of 
                                                 
174 Although under current legal framework, the word deposit and the legal protections afforded to such banking products are 
not applicable to cryptocurrencies. 
175 See for example: Hal Finney, "Re: Bitcoin Bank."; European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes," 39.; However, 
such activities would expose businesses to risks of maturity and liquidity transformation. As in the absence of a LOLR, 
establishing safeguards to alleviate the risks of maturity and liquidity transformation in decentralized cryptocurrencies would 
be virtually impossible, engaging in deposit-taking and lending would not be appealing to cryptocurrency businesses. 
Accordingly, it is less likely that the role of the banking sector in maturity and liquidity transformation would be disrupted 
by the developments in the cryptocurrency business. 
176 However, some lending platforms engage in cryptocurrency lending and some exchanges do margin lending at the 
moment. 
177 This is made redundant by the introduction of fixed rate full allotment policy (FRFA). See: Carlos Garcia-de-Andoain et 
al., "Lending-of-Last-Resort Is as Lending-of-Last-Resort Does: Central Bank Liquidity Provision and Interbank Market 
Functioning in the Euro Area," ECB Working Paper Series No 1886  (2016): 10. 
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an ultimate liquidity provider. Although some projects for stablecoins, such as Basis,178 are being 
structured on the algorithmic central banking model, which provides for price stability using 
flexibility in money supply, it is unlikely that stablecoin experiments would succeed in the presence 
of credible central banks with long-established reputation for price stability. 
The third scenario, in which banks would involve in cryptocurrency businesses, is that banks 
themselves would engage in issuing such currencies either for retail payment services or for wholesale 
payments. Whether it is prudentially acceptable for banks or a consortium of banks to be allowed to 
issue their own retail-oriented cryptocurrencies or use settlement tokens in clearing and settling 
obligations remains an open question. Potential liquidity and legal challenges that this type of money 
creation and in particular its use in privately organized clearing and settlement systems can face 
would not rally in favor of such developments. 
The fourth scenario would be for banks to offer cryptocurrency accounts or custodian wallets, 
establish proprietary trading desks in cryptocurrencies or eventually offer cryptocurrency funds, 
including Exchange Traded Fund (ETFs), or cryptocurrency derivative products.179 However, given 
the liquidity risks in the cryptocurrency business and its derivatives, regulators, including the ECB, 
either in their supervisory role or as a catalyst for change may consider banning banks from trading in 
cryptocurrencies. Such a strategy may be implemented through the competent authorities of the 
Member States through the mechanism offered by article 104 of the Capital Requirements Directive 
IV (CRD IV), empowering competent authorities “to restrict or limit the business, operations or 
network of institutions or to request the divestment of activities that pose excessive risks to the 
soundness of the institution”, or “to require the reduction of the risk inherent in the activities” or to 
impose additional capital and liquidity requirements.180 In addition, the ECB can make use of its 
supervisory powers within the framework of its comprehensive assessment (asset quality review 
(AQR) and stress testing) and establish a stricter framework for assessing credit institutions’ exposure 
to cryptocurrencies. Alternatively, regulators may consider imposing structural regulation,181 such as 
ring-fencing of proprietary trading in cryptocurrencies from other activities of banks, or imposing 
                                                 
178 For more details see: https://www.basis.io/. For a critique of this project, see: Jemima Kelly, "The John Taylor-Backed 
“Stablecoin” That's Backed by, Um, Stability," Financial Times June 25, 2018. This project was shut down in December 
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activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338–436 (CRD IV). See also: 
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subsidiarization requirements for activities related to cryptocurrencies to avoid cross-subsidization of 
cryptocurrency proprietary trading by the governments’ implicit and explicit subsidies to banks.182 
6. Cryptocurrencies and financial stability 
At the time of this writing, there is a lack of reliable empirical evidence on the impact of 
cryptocurrencies on the banking system and financial stability. In addition to the lack of data, the 
existing data may be manipulated by market-manipulating activities such as wash trading, spoofing, 
and pump and dump strategies.183 Despite all the above questions and hypothetical scenarios, the 
available data suggest that the market capitalization, leverage, and interconnectedness in the 
cryptoasset markets are unlikely to destabilize banking system and financial markets, or negatively 
affect the real economy. The correlation in the price of cryptoassets may suggest that there might be a 
risk of herd behavior in cryptocurrency markets. However, even in the presence of herd behavior, the 
small size of the industry would not imply that such price movements would cause systemic risk. 
Indeed, the passive approach to regulating cryptocurrency markets heretofore can also be attributable 
to their insignificant size relative to conventional financial markets. At its peak, cryptocurrency 
market capitalization reached around $800bn. This figure pales in comparison to the total assets of the 
Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) in the euro area which in March 2017 stood at around €34tr.184 
The total market capitalization of the overall cryptocurrencies at its peak was smaller than the market 
capitalization of the largest NASDAQ listed company (i.e., Apple Inc.) with a market capitalization of 
$1.08tr as of September 11, 2018. At the same time, the market capitalization of bitcoin, the largest 
and the most popular cryptocurrency was around $110bn and the total market capitalisation of all 
cryptocurrencies stood at around $189bn.185  
                                                 
182 See: Hossein Nabilou, "Bank Proprietary Trading and Investment in Private Funds: Is the Volcker Rule a Panacea or yet 
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Therefore, even the collapse of the overall cryptocurrency market is unlikely to give rise to any 
financial stability concerns.186 In addition to this insignificant size, the limitations on the ECB’s 
powers would constrain its role in financial stability even in the presence of systemic risks of 
cryptocurrency markets. 
Despite the fact that the possibility of a systemic impact in the future cannot be ruled out,187 this paper 
will not consider systemic externality as a ground for regulatory intervention in the cryptoasset 
markets.188 The reason is twofold. In addition to the lack of reliable data, which is explained above, 
the ECB has a limited role in maintaining financial stability. The ECB is a single-mandate central 
bank with price stability being central to its tasks. With respect to the contribution of the ECB to 
financial stability, the TFEU uses a rather nuanced wording. Article 127(5) of the TFEU explicitly 
mentions that “[t]he ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the 
competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of 
the financial system.”189 [Emphasis added] Although “[p]rice stability and financial stability are 
tightly interconnected and mutually reinforcing”,190 financial stability is not among the objectives of 
the ECB according to the first paragraph of the Art. 127, neither is it among its four basic tasks. 
Accordingly, the ECB lacks appropriate regulatory, supervisory or operational tools in the area of 
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financial stability.191 This means that even if cryptocurrencies posed systemic risk to the financial 
system, the ECB would not have sufficient tools to address such risks.192 With respect to financial 
stability, the ECB has only a ‘contributory and supporting role’,193 which is different from the shared 
competence and has the narrowest scope. Accordingly, in the euro area, the primary responsibility of 
maintaining financial stability remains with the national competent authorities.194  
However, it is likely that financial stability concerns may eventually materialize through the banking 
or payment systems, and in this regard, the prudential supervisory powers of the ECB on credit 
institutions can play an important role in mitigating such risks. The supervisory competence of the 
ECB is limited to the prudential supervision of credit institutions within the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), the details of which are laid out in the SSM regulation,195 SSM framework 
regulation,196 EBA regulation197 and the ECB’s Guide to Banking Supervision, the detailed treatment 
of which would go beyond this article.198 As the scaling solutions for cryptocurrencies are being 
developed, it seems that the majority of the activities within the cryptocurrency ecosystem would 
migrate to second layers, and the protocol level would only be used for secure (deferred) net 
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settlements. As participants in the second layers would likely to be banks, payment institutions, and 
other financial institutions, the powers of the ECB in the supervision of credit institutions and 
payments system will be of utmost importance. Thus, given the possibility of such developments and 
due to the limitations on the ECB’s mandate, the ECB can best intervene indirectly in the 
cryptocurrency markets if systemic risk were to stem from cryptocurrency markets. 
7. Indirect technical intervention 
Frictions in payments across national boundaries and the lack of a global currency have played an 
important role in giving birth to some of the most prominent use-cases of cryptocurrencies, such as 
those in the remittance business. As mentioned above, one of the strategies that could be deployed by 
central banks is technical intervention in cryptocurrency markets. In this section, we explore the 
venues for indirect technical intervention in the cryptocurrency markets by the ECB, which could be 
achieved not by regulating the existing cryptocurrencies, but by issuing its own cryptocurrencies. This 
would be an indirect intervention because it only affects cryptocurrencies by providing an alternative 
virtual currency that exerts a competitive force on cryptocurrencies by leveraging on its price 
stability. 
Before issuing CBDC, to pick up the lowest hanging fruit, central banks can start by improving the 
current payment infrastructures. For example, they can join forces with their foreign counterparts 
within the international financial fora or encourage payment and banking associations to enhance the 
efficiency of their existing infrastructure for international or cross-border fund transfers.199 Current 
improvements to the payment systems catalyzed by the ECB as well as payment associations can be 
considered as methods to achieve such objectives. A case in point is the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer 
(SCT-Inst) – launched in November 2017 - enabling instant payments in euro across Europe around 
the clock, 365 days a year.200 TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS), offering a real-time 
settlement in CeBM, which went live on November 30, 2018, is another step forward in this direction. 
By making such infrastructure available to banking and other payment institutions, the ECB, in 
cooperation with its international peers and in its catalyst role, can encourage the banking system to 
lower fees for international payments and enhance their efficiency.  
Furthermore, widening the choice of available online or digital payment instruments accommodating 
wider features in terms of efficiency, anonymity, and security would provide another alternative for 
cryptocurrencies and eventually may lead to mitigation of their potential impact. The existing 
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payment instruments, such as cash, debit and credit cards, electronic fund transfers or wire transfers 
(including credit transfers and direct debits), online payment platforms, and e-money offer a wide 
range of payment solutions. However, privacy and - to a lesser degree – security in online payments 
are still in short supply, despite the fact that the existence of prepaid payment cards (such as gift 
cards) would provide certain levels of privacy. 
Since the demand for privacy in payments will not disappear by a potential cash elimination, offering 
means of digital payments that would provide certain levels of privacy is to continue. Otherwise, the 
privacy-conscious users of cash or even the mafia and gangsters would migrate to more privacy-
enhancing cryptocurrencies or to developing their own IOUs, eventually giving rise to unforeseen and 
unintended consequences.201 Further improvements would be achieved by reducing the amount of 
cross-subsidization that exists in the use of different payment instruments, the most important of 
which has been in existence in the indirect and hidden relationship between card users and cash users, 
where the latter cross-subsidize the former.202 The adoption of the Multilateral Interchange Fee (MIF) 
Regulation partly alleviates this problem but falls short of eliminating it. 
Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that the use of cryptocurrencies is not entirely driven by 
efficiency considerations. Censorship of payments has been a major driver of cryptocurrencies. 
Although censorship resistance would be frowned upon under democratic and accountable 
governments, such a property would still be useful for citizens living under less democratic and less 
accountable governments. Under those regimes, censorship resistance property of cryptocurrencies 
can empower citizens by providing a global uncensorable digital store of value and medium of 
exchange, which is independent of the whims of the unaccountable political actors.  
The overuse and abuse of international payment infrastructures for political purposes and sanction 
regimes can also encourage the use of censorship-resistant decentralized cryptocurrencies. The recent 
calls for establishing international payment rails independent of the US have shown the frustration 
with the hegemony of a single dominant player having formal (i.e., through extraterritorial application 
of its laws) and informal dominance over international payment infrastructures.203 Detaching 
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21, 2018.; Yves Mersch, "Strengthening the European Financial Industry Amid Disruptive Global Challenges," Speech by 
Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the European Institute of Financial Regulation (EIFR), Paris, 3 
September 2018  (September 3, 2018).; JP Koning, "Monetary Exclusion," American Institute for Economic Research  (July 
26, 2018). 
For the first practical steps taken at the EU level, see: European Union External Action - European External Action Service, 
"Implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Joint Ministerial Statement," news release, September 24, 
2018, September 24, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/51036/implementation-joint-
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wavering winds of politics from critical (payment) infrastructures and decreasing the use of payment 
systems for sanctions would mitigate the use of cryptocurrencies both within state actors and 
individuals. Even within the existing sanctions regimes, provisions can be made to make cross-border 
payments available for international micro-payments (i.e., de minimus exception). Such an exception 
can mitigate the impact of sanctions on ordinary citizens of sanctioned countries and could discourage 
them from switching to alternative payment methods with higher risk profiles. 
7.1. Issuing CBDC 
In addition to the above mentioned incremental changes that the ECB can effect or catalyze, the main 
innovative and radical non-regulatory action that it can take as a strategy to provide alternatives the 
growth of privately issued cryptocurrencies is the issuance of CBDC or DBM.204 This could offer a 
stable virtual currency to users and could function as a unit of account in cryptocurrency markets the 
lack of which currently poses one of the most challenging issues that cryptocurrency markets face. 
The mounting interest in creating stablecoins in the cryptocurrency industry in 2018 showed the 
importance of price stability for an effective digital medium of exchange. However, most of these 
attempts were limited to using collateralization techniques to create safety and stability giving birth to 
stablecoins that are either collateralized by fiat money or by cryptocurrencies. Prior financial crises, 
and in particular runs on repos during such crises, have demonstrated that such techniques can hardly 
bring long-term safety and stability. In the case of cryptocurrencies based on algorithmic central 
banking, it is hard to imagine their success in the absence of a long-established reputation of price 
stability. This might prove to be a window of opportunity for central banks to leverage their existing 
credibility to create stable CBDC. However, as it will be explained, issuing CBDC would potentially 
face practical, financial stability as well as legal challenges. 
Although the power to issue banknotes and coins is the sole prerogative of governments, it may not 
necessarily include the power to issue CBDC, because issuing CBDC does not seems to be merely an 
inconsequential technological upgrade to the old-age technology of issuing money. As the CBDC 
would be programmable money, its nature would be different from that of the physical banknotes and 
coins. This property of CBDC means that it can accommodate features that can potentially amount to 
granting additional powers to central banks, such as having higher surveillance power over 
transactions and imposing negative interest rates, that would otherwise be absent or limited. 
Therefore, from a public law perspective, issuing CBDC by the ECB would face legal hurdles.  
                                                                                                                                                        
comprehensive-plan-action-joint-ministerial-statement_en., For more details, see also: Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Axel 
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204 For a definition of CBDC and its unique features as compared to banknotes and CeBM, see: Phoebus L. Athanassiou, 
Digital Innovation in Financial Services: Legal Challenges and Regulatory Policy Issues, 185. CBDC would be different 
from e-money. One of the first central banks contemplating to issue CBDC is the Sveriges Riksbank. See: Sveriges 
Riksbank, "The Riksbank’s E‐Krona Project, Report 1."; Sveriges Riksbank, "The Riksbank’s E‐Krona Project Report 2." 
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Moreover, from technical and economic perspectives, issuing CBDC has proved to be controversial as 
it carries many risks alongside its potential benefits.205 Despite the perceived benefits of issuing 
CBDC in term of price stability, the smooth operation of payment systems and the conduct of 
monetary policy - e.g. removing the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on monetary policy 
operations - the decision to issue CBDC should be made taking a full account of a set of broader 
policy objectives, including technical (safety and efficiency considerations), economic and legal 
considerations such as technological neutrality and the users’ freedom of choice of means of 
payments.206 Therefore, in addition to the objectives of price stability, the impact of issuing CBDC on 
the implementation of monetary policy and the smooth operation of the payment system, its impact on 
banking and financial stability (e.g., encouraging bank runs) and on the efficient and decentralized 
allocation of credit should be carefully studied.207  
Here, we only study the CBDC from a legal perspective and analyze if the ECB has the power to issue 
such cryptocurrencies. For example, art. 127 TFEU states that “[t]he ESCB shall act in accordance 
with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation 
of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 119”.208 Issuing CBDC would be 
in contradiction with this provision if it were to lead to a centralized allocation of credit by central 
banks. Therefore, before engaging in issuing such digital currencies, it is prudent to examine if the 
TFEU or the ESCB/ECB Statute and other monetary laws of the EU grant such powers to the ECB 
and how issuing such currencies might come into conflict with the basic tenets and principles 
enshrined in the EU primary and secondary laws.209 In what follows, we briefly touch upon the 
various hypothetical design features of CBDC and then will have an overview of its impact on 
banking and financial stability, on the efficient allocation of credit as well as its implications for the 
future of central banking in terms of its accountability and independence. 
7.2. Design features of CBDC 
CBDC may take various forms and based on its specific design features, it could give rise to different 
legal challenges. For example, a CBDC could be account based or value based,210 or it can be issued 
only for wholesale purposes or for retail purposes. Account-based CBDC would be booked in the 
                                                 
205 For an overview of the pros and cons, various design features, as well as macroeconomic impact of issuing CBDC, see: 
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accounts of the third parties holding accounts with the issuing central bank and the process of its 
transfer (including, in particular, the legal finality) would be conducted on the books of the issuing 
central bank.211 Account-based CBDC would be similar to reserve balances, with the only difference 
that besides commercial banks, account-holders would be also natural and legal persons. In contrast, 
value-based CBDC would be in the form of digitally stored tokens or units stored in the e-wallets of 
holders, but its transfer would be conducted and finalized in a decentralized or P2P fashion. Similar to 
cash, this form of CBDC would possibly provide users with anonymity with regard to the central 
bank.212 Additional variations in design would include whether the CBDC is intended to substitute or 
complement bank deposits and cash, whether the holders of CBDC would be natural or legal persons 
or both, whether such currencies should provide a level of anonymity, at-par convertibility, and 
interest accrual.213  
The use of blockchain or DLT would not be necessary for CBDC, as is the case with E-Krona project 
of the Riksbank.214 In any event, it seems that the main difference between CBDC and other 
cryptocurrencies are that, in the former, as the name suggests, there remains a level of centralization; 
in account-based CBDC, both legs of creation and settlement are centralized, while in value-based 
CBDC, only the creation and destruction of money is centralized, and the transaction settlement 
would be decentralized. In this sense, CBDC is not in line with the initial vision of the invention of 
the cryptocurrencies. As neither the use of the blockchain technology nor its decentralization promise 
is likely to be implemented in the CBDC, it would bear no resemblance to cryptocurrencies such as 
bitcoin and its discussion under the rubric of cryptocurrencies would remain doubtful. 
Additionally, as there is already DBM in the form of commercial banks’ deposits with central banks 
for the purposes of wholesale settlements, the need for issuing CBDC for wholesale purposes remain 
questionable. It might be said that the main advantage of CBDC over other cryptocurrencies lies in its 
stability. However, in the absence of interoperability arrangements, such stability comes at the price 
of its geographic limit and its attachment to a single central bank. Unlike bitcoin, in the absence of a 
fiat-based global currency, such as the proposed Bancor envisioned by Keynes, CBDCs would only 
enjoy stability in relative terms as their value will continue to float against one another in the Forex 
markets.   
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The multiplicity of design features of the CBDC and the limitations of space in this article would not 
allow further speculation on its effect on price stability, monetary policy, payment systems, and 
banking and financial stability. In the following section, we only provide some preliminary 
observations on the impact of CBDC on banking and financial stability, efficient allocation of 
financial resources, and on the monetary policy based on certain assumptions on the design features of 
the CBDC. 
7.3. Impact on banking and financial stability  
One important implication of issuing CBDC would be that the introduction of CBDC would move 
substantial parts of the balances in the transaction accounts of the commercial banks’ customers onto 
the central banks’ balance sheets. This is because with the introduction of CBDC if a commercial 
bank cannot compensate its customers for the extra counterparty risk inherent in CoBM, there would 
be no reason to hold balances with a commercial bank. Deprived of the customer deposits, 
commercial banks are likely to become highly dependent on the wholesale funding markets with 
higher interest rates215 and less stable funding (short-term maturities), intensifying the maturity 
mismatch and liquidity problems in the banking sector. In addition, issuing CBDC may also result in 
the banking sector instability, especially in times of crises, where the depositors switch deposits from 
their commercial bank accounts to their CBDC account with central banks, facilitating a run from 
bank deposits to the safety of the CBDC.216 This might not be a socially optimal outcome as it would 
amount to commercial banking disintermediation in normal times217 and ‘destabilizing flight to 
quality’ in distressed times.218  
However, such an impact is ultimately dependent on the design features of CBDC. If the design of the 
CBDC would entail disintermediated public access to the central bank balance sheet,219 in the absence 
of any other remedies, introducing CBDC would result in destabilizing consequences for the banking 
sector. Since the introduction of CBDC is likely to transform the banking business model, banks need 
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to evolve in response to such developments; otherwise, it would likely put the banking stability at 
risk.220 Such a consequence would be inimical to the ESCB’s statutory mandate of contributing to 
“the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system.”221 
7.4. Impact on the efficient allocation of resources 
Despite the fact that credit institutions, public entities, and other market participants can have access 
to the ECB and NCBs’ balance sheets,222 currently, aside from holding cash, the general public has 
only an indirect or intermediated access to the ECB’s balance sheets. The introduction of CBDC 
would imply a disintermediated public access to the central bank balance sheet, which means that the 
public could open an account at the central bank directly. Such direct access to central bank balance 
sheet is not unprecedented, as the Bank of England and the Sveriges Riksbank used to allow private 
accounts; this practice discontinued for practical reasons.223 
As this disintermediated access might cause CoBM (bank deposits) to shrink, banks’ ability to make 
loans – at least under the fractional reserve theory of banking – would be substantially restricted. As 
granting credit by banks amounts to the decentralized creation of money or credit in the financial 
system, removing such a function from the banking industry and granting direct access to central bank 
balance sheet may eventually lead to centralization of credit allocation under the control of central 
banks. This, in turn, would be detrimental to the efficient allocation of credit in the economy and 
would undermine “the principle of an open market economy with free competition” enshrined in the 
article 127 of the TFEU and article 2 of the ESCB/ECB Statute.224   
7.5. A need for increased accountability of central banks 
The recent intellectual assault on cash and the move towards cashless society adds another layer of 
complexity to the potential impact of issuing CBDC.225 Although a case against cash is far from being 
settled,226 the move towards digitization seems inevitable. Thus far, cash provides the only direct 
access to central bank balance sheets for the general public. If the introduction of CBDC is 
simultaneous with abolishing cash and banning other forms of private money (such as 
cryptocurrencies), it would effectively remove the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) constraint in the conduct 
of monetary policy. On the upside, this would empower central banks with strong tools for the 
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implementation of monetary policy. However, on the downside, it would entail a de facto power of 
slashing bank deposits or cryptocurrency deposits with central banks. Although negative interest rates 
have proven to work even in the presence of cash, the existence of cash and other alternatives would 
create an effective lower bound and limit the depth of the negative territory a central bank can march 
in. 
In addition, physical cash provides users with “irrevocable access to the payments system”.227 As 
payment systems are part of the FMIs, account-based CBDC would ease revoking legal and natural 
persons’ access to such FMIs, giving rise to potential financial inclusion concerns. Financial inclusion 
risks have been partly addressed in the traditional payment services by the Payment Accounts 
Directive (PAD).228 However, the PAD in its current form, may not be applicable to payments 
systems based on CBDC. In the event of introducing CBDC, it seems that this Directive needs to be 
amended to include access to CBDC. Otherwise, introducing CBDC would grant further censorship 
powers to the state vis-à-vis individuals, especially if the introduction of an account-based CBDC 
would coincide with the abolition of physical cash.229 Therefore, it seems that the risks associated 
with the introduction of CBDC as well as the new powers that it furnishes for central banks may 
require higher levels of central bank public accountability, appropriate safeguards, and standards of 
judicial scrutiny. 
Physical cash is the main mechanism that facilitates the use of currencies, such as the USD and the 
euro, to be used as the backup to the global monetary system.230 As these currencies are used as a 
store of value and a fail-safe option outside their own country of issue or currency area, issuing 
CBDC to replace physical cash would jeopardize these currencies’ role in the global payments and 
monetary systems, a policy concern that should not be overlooked in the decision over issuing CBDC. 
To summarize, depending on the design features of the CBDC, the ECB could face legal risks in 
issuing such a currency in addition to the technical issues, and potential transitional risks. Unless 
appropriate safeguards are in place to protect citizens from the potential abuse triggered by the 
absence of the ZBL constraint, to minimize the potentially destabilizing impact of CBDC on banking 
and financial stability, to allow the efficient allocation of credit in a decentralized manner, and to 
address the potential concerns about financial inclusion and privacy, a shadow of doubt could be cast 
on the attempts to introduce CBDC by the ECB. 
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8. International coordination through international financial fora 
The regulation of cryptocurrencies faces both boundary and border problems.231 Firstly, 
cryptocurrencies are global in nature and it would be difficult for any single jurisdiction to address 
their potential risks without international cooperation. This means that another venue through which 
the ECB can engage in the regulation of cryptocurrencies is through its engagement in the 
international financial fora. Secondly, the ECB’s tasks both in the area of regulation, supervision and 
oversight, and monetary policy require certain degrees of international cooperation. Accordingly, the 
ECB has various types of memberships in the IMF, the Group of Twenty (G20), the BIS, the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB).232  
From the above-mentioned international financial fora, the FSB stands out. As promoting 
international financial stability is the FSB’s primary objective,233 it could function as a platform for 
monitoring and coordinating the developments in the area of cryptocurrencies.234 Regarding systemic 
risk concerns, and given the borderless nature of cryptocurrencies, the FSB, as an international agenda 
setter,235 is well placed to monitor the potential future systemic risks of cryptocurrencies.236 Central 
banks are expressly eligible for membership of the FSB.237 Therefore, the ECB and other central 
banks can play a significant role, though indirectly, in monitoring global developments in the 
ecosystem and coordinating the international financial regulatory developments. 
The international coordination in the area of cryptoassets as related to the regulation and supervision 
of the banking system to enhance financial stability would largely remain with the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS). In this respect, BCBS has ongoing initiatives on quantifying the 
materiality of direct and indirect exposures of the banking system to cryptoassets, prudential treatment 
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of such exposures and monitoring the development in this area and assessing their implications for 
banks.238  
Despite its shortcomings, the soft-law nature of international financial regulation239 can serve the 
international financial fora in addressing the potential concerns about cryptocurrencies, as it can react 
to incredibly fast-moving and constantly evolving cryptocurrency ecosystem. Such swift regulatory 
responses would not be possible under the hard-law framework of a specific jurisdiction or 
international organizations. Relying on the advantages of soft law over the tardier nature of hard law, 
it is expected that such international cooperation and coordination to grow hand in hand with the 
developments of the cryptoasset and cryptocurrency markets. 
Conclusion  
This paper studied the potential risks of cryptocurrencies to the instruments, activities, and entities 
that fall within the basic and ancillary tasks of the ECB over which it has regulatory, supervisory or 
oversight powers. It found that cryptocurrencies can potentially have direct and indirect effects on 
central banking. Direct effects mainly concern the risks to the price stability and to the conduct of 
monetary policy. In addition, risks to the central bank monopoly over issuing banknotes and coins are 
considered as a direct effect because such a monopoly would be instrumental to the conduct of 
monetary policy and the objective of price stability. In contrast, the indirect effects are those that 
largely stem from the interface between the banking and payment systems with cryptocurrencies, both 
of which fall within the scope of competence of the ECB. Accordingly, this paper suggests that the 
ECB’s regulatory measures to address such challenges can take two main forms: i.e., direct and 
indirect regulatory, supervisory and oversight measures. Direct measures may include direct technical 
measures and direct regulatory measures. Given the ECB’s defined mandate and the legal constraints 
on the tools at its disposal, the ECB would face legal and technical constraints in effectively 
intervening in cryptocurrency markets directly. Rather, the main venue through which the ECB can 
take action is through indirect channels using its regulatory, supervisory and oversight powers over 
banking and payment systems, which may include setting participation and access criteria for 
payment and banking institutions with substantial cryptocurrency activities for access to ECB’s 
payment and settlement infrastructures, or within the framework of its comprehensive assessment 
(asset quality review (AQR) and stress testing), establishing a new framework for assessing credit 
institutions’ exposure to cryptocurrencies.  
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At the time of this writing, since cryptocurrencies do not pose a significant risk to the scope of the 
mandate of the ECB, adjustments or amendments to the relevant primary and secondary legislation 
governing the ECB and its operations would not be needed, as the indirect tools at the disposal of the 
ECB are likely to address the potential risks stemming from cryptocurrencies. However, as future 
developments would render such changes necessary,240 the paper highlighted some of those potential 
areas of legal change that the potential wider use and adoption of private cryptocurrencies and 
potential issuance of CBDC may require. 
Given that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are programmable and capable of accommodating 
various innovative features (e.g., colored coins/smart contracts), an intrusive and direct approach to its 
regulation would stifle the potential future innovations that would be built upon the Bitcoin protocol 
layer, some of which may go beyond the field of central banking, money and finance and would be 
hard to fathom at the moment. Viewing Bitcoin as an evolving open-source, work-in-progress 
protocol warrants a nuanced indirect and light-touch regulatory approach, which is data dependent, 
and defers to the virtues of experimentation, spontaneous discovery process241 and evolutionary 
dynamics in the financial system.242 
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